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function from the lenses of theory and policy. Patents are conditioned on
inventors describing their inventions, but the inner workings and the use
of AI in the inventive process are not properly understood or are largely
unknown. The lack of transparency of the parameters of the AI inventive
process or the use of AI makes it difficult to enable a future use of AI to
achieve the same end state. While patent law’s enablement doctrine
focuses on the particular result of the invention process, in contrast, this
Article suggests that AI presents a lack of transparency and difficulty in
replication that profoundly and fundamentally challenge disclosure
theory in patent law. A reasonable onlooker or a patent examiner may
find it difficult to explain the inner workings of AI. But even more
pressing is a non-detection problem—an overall lack of disclosure of
unidentified AI inventions, or knowing whether the particular end state
was produced by the use of AI.
The complexities of AI require enhancing the disclosure
requirement since the peculiar characteristics of the end state cannot be
described by the inventive process that produced it. This Article
introduces a taxonomy of AI and argues that an enhanced AI patent
disclosure requirement mitigates concerns surrounding the explainability
of AI-based tools and the inherent inscrutability of AI-generated output.
Such emphasis of patent disclosure for AI may steer some inventors
toward trade secrecy and push others to seek patent protection against
would-be patent infringers despite added ex ante costs and efforts.
Utilitarian and Lockean theories suggest justifications for enhanced AI
patent disclosure while recognizing some objections. Turning to the
prescriptive, this Article proposes and assesses, as means for achieving
enhanced disclosure, a variety of disclosure-specific incentives and data
deposits for AI. It concludes by offering insights for innovation and for a
future empirical study to verify its theoretical underpinnings.
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INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) inventions are artificial.1 There is
much disagreement about what it means to be artificial. I define
“artificial” broadly to mean that inventors use AI-based tools in the
inventive process or AI-based tools invent autonomously to produce AIgenerated output without human intervention. AI-based tools (run by
1. See Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future
of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1083–85 (2019) (explaining that AI is characterized
by autonomously-created inventions, can brainstorm inventions, and is self-assembling);
Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1305,
1307 (2019) (describing AI as using technology to automate tasks that normally require
human intelligence); Clark D. Asay, Artificial Stupidity, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1187,
1190 (2020) (defining AI as computing systems that perform tasks that normally would
require human intelligence); see also KAY FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & YOON CHAE,
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE COLLIDES WITH PATENT LAW 5 (Apr. 2018),
https://bit.ly/3eloC0N (defining AI as “a computerized system exhibiting behavior
commonly thought of as requiring intelligence” or “a system capable of rationally solving
complex problems or taking appropriate action to achieve its goals in real-world
circumstances”); Chris Smith et al., The History of Artificial Intelligence, U. WASH., Dec.
2006, at 4, https://bit.ly/36xGwec (defining AI as “a system which amplifie[d] people’s
own knowledge and understanding”); Phillipe Aghion et al., Artificial Intelligence and
Economic Growth 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23928, 2017),
https://bit.ly/3goqSGp (defining AI as “the capability of a machine to imitate intelligent
human behavior [or] an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of
environments”); Sean Semmler & Zeeve Rose, Comment, Artificial Intelligence:
Application Today and Implications Tomorrow, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85, 86 (2017)
(defining AI as “the process of simulating human intelligence through machine
processes”).
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complex algorithms) and AI-generated output (the result of applying
such complex algorithms), are rapidly proliferating in business2 and
becoming ubiquitous in society.3 The potential societal benefits and costs
of AI-based tools and AI-generated output force re-examination of the
basic tenets of patent law, since the exact parameters of AI-based tools
and their use in the inventive process are not clear, and since it is
difficult to reproduce the same end state in the future.4 Should patent
grants to AI inventors be conditioned upon more transparent disclosure
of AI? Does the black-box nature of AI jeopardize the normatively
desirable transparency5 of patent disclosure? Are patents that cover
2. See James Bessen et. Al., The Business of AI Startups 2, 3, 26 (B. U. Sch. of L.,
L. & Econs. Research Paper, Working Paper No. 18-28, 2018), https://bit.ly/36wmQXT
(suggesting that AI dramatically alters the economy and ways of conducting business
where it is applied, enhances human capabilities in commercial applications, and changes
competition and entry barriers for startups); Jason Furman & Robert Seamans, AI and the
Economy at 1–2, 17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24689, 2018),
https://bit.ly/3epai7z (explaining that AI is having a large effect on the economy, will
increase productivity and economic growth, and could lower the cost of doing business);
see also Roberto Moro Visconti, The Valuation of Artificial Intelligence, UNIVERSITÀ
CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE at 3–5 (2019), https://bit.ly/2zvAsql (noting that AI can be
applied to a variety of business models, including business-to-business (B2B), businessto-consumer (B2C), back-office infrastructure, and business applications such as web
search engines, e-mail Spam detectors, virtual personal assistants, or any business
application where forecasting plays a fundamental role in decision-making or increases
the value of data).
3. See Andrei Iancu, Remarks by Director Iancu at the Artificial
Intelligence/Intellectual Property Considerations Event, USPTO (Jan. 31, 2019)
[hereinafter Remarks by Director Iancu at the AI Event] (unpublished manuscript),
https://bit.ly/3gr6RyM. The USPTO Director stated:
Today, AI is becoming ubiquitous in our society. For example, faster, morepowerful processors and chips now provide sufficient computing power to
perform trillions of calculations per second. Very quickly, AI technologies are
evolving from far-off dreams of science fiction to mainstream, everyday uses
that take computers to new levels at awe-inspiring speeds.
Id.
4. See S. 2217, 115th Cong. (2017) (introducing Congress’s first major steps toward
comprehensive regulation of the AI tech sector as AI technologies become ubiquitous in
society); H.R. 4625, 115th Cong. (2017) (same); see also Exec. Order No. 13859, 84 Fed.
Reg. 3967 (Feb. 11, 2019) (introducing the United States’ national strategy on artificial
intelligence that aims to promote and protect AI technology and innovation for U.S.
society); Roberto Verganti, Luca Vendraminelli & Marco Iansiti, Innovation and Design
in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 37 J. PROD. MGMT. 212, 215–19 (2020) (describing
implications of design on innovation policies, which are based on the analysis of AI—the
practices, principles, and theory of AI design—as an inherently decision-making
technology that automates many tasks relating to learning and devising solutions in a
number of business processes and virtually every industrial setting); Iain Cockburn,
Rebecca Henderson & Scott Stern, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Innovation 7
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24449, 2017),
https://bit.ly/3dTFImw.
5. See Robert Brauneis & Ellen Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart
City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 107–08, 110, 132 (2018) (suggesting that a lack of
transparency refers to “the use of algorithms that are highly dynamic or that use modeling
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inventions developed by the use of AI-based tools being granted at an
alarming enough frequency such that it causes serious problems to the
patent system, and if so, how should patent law and the administration of
the patent system evolve?
AI6 involvement in the invention process falls on a technological
spectrum and is controversial for the patent system. At one end of the
spectrum, an AI-based tool assists a human inventor without contributing
to the conception of the invention; at the other end of the spectrum, an
AI-based tool produces AI-generated output that would satisfy
patentability if otherwise created by a human. However, controversy
arises over whether patents’ disclosure function is inhibited when an AIbased tool’s operation is unexplainable7 (not discernible to the relevant
audience) or the production of AI-generated output is inherently

which makes them difficult to interpret even when records are revealed” and implying
that transparency refers to: disclosing predictive models or algorithms, opaque “black
box” processes, or “black boxes”; additionally, suggesting that meaningful transparency
is demonstrating the knowledge that is sufficient to approve or disapprove of the
algorithm’s performance); David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho, Artificially
Intelligent Government: A Review and Agenda, in ROLAND VOGL, BIG DATA LAW
(forthcoming 2020) (stating that “transparency requires, at a minimum, a description of
the decision’s ‘provenance,’ including an accounting of its inputs and outputs and the
main factors that drove it”); Alfred Früh, Transparency in the Patent System: Artificial
Intelligence and the Disclosure Requirement, in RETHINKING PATENT LAW AS AN
INCENTIVE TO INNOVATION (Žaneta Pacud & Rafał Sikorski eds., forthcoming 2019),
https://bit.ly/2LXDZjV; Michèle Finck, Automated Decision-Making and Administrative
Law, in MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION RESEARCH PAPER
SERIES 14 (Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition Research, Research Paper No.
19-10, 2020) (stating that transparency can emerge where the learning dataset and source
code are disclosed together within information regarding its design and parameters);
Andrew Burt, The AI Transparency Paradox, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2MRLEAB (implying that transparency refers to a lack of opaque
algorithms); Alex Engler, The Case for AI Transparency Requirement, BROOKINGS INST.
(Jan. 22, 2020), https://brook.gs/2zoSwCn (suggesting that a lack of transparency refers
to anonymity in the AI context).
6. I define artificial intelligence broadly, to include various umbrella terms such as
“machine learning,” “big-data analytics,” “deep learning,” “smart machines,” “neural
networks,” “learning algorithms,” and “reinforcement learning.” For the purposes of this
Article, I do not parse differences in the technological meanings of these terms or delve
deeply into specific technological techniques. However, I briefly summarize the basic
properties of AI in Part I of this Article. It is sufficient to note that AI is not a monolith.
7. See Arti K. Rai, Machine Learning at the Patent Office: Lessons for Patents and
Administrative Law, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2617, 2625 (2019) (viewing “explainability on a
spectrum with ‘complete’ explainability meaning that the algorithm’s complete
decisionmaking can be made fully understandable to the relevant human audience”);
Finck, supra note 5, at 15 (defining “explainability” as the opening of the black box or an
analysis of the computational logic that transforms an input into an output, as well as an
examination of the system by comparing its inputs and outputs; also suggesting that
explainability is narrower than transparency).
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inscrutable8 (not understandable as to how, or from which method it was
produced).9 Enablement, which provides the statutory form of disclosure,
has presented problems in many technological domains, and AI presents
a new challenge due to the opaqueness and its rapid use acceleration that
necessitates an reevaluation of disclosure theory. While other AI-based
patent law scholarship10 has assessed these issues as they pertain to
8. See Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable
Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1094 (2018) (defining “inscrutability” in this
context as “a situation in which the rules that govern decision-making are so complex,
numerous, and interdependent that they defy practical inspection and resist
comprehension”); Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking and Inscrutable Automated
Decision Tools, 119 COLUM. L.R. 1851, 1851 (2019) (describing that inscrutability
undermines the traditional function of explanation (in rulemaking) and suggesting that
inscrutability refers to difficulty in assessing “whether decision criteria will generalize to
unusual cases or new situations and heightens communication and coordination barriers
between data scientists and new situations and heightens communication barriers between
data scientists and subject matter experts”).
9. Consider as an example U.S. Patent No. 6,845,336 (Jan. 18, 2005), owned by
Plaintiff Neochloris and asserted against Defendants Emerson Process Management LLP
and CITGO Petroleum Corporation in Neochloris, Inc. v. Emerson Process Mgmt, LLLP,
where the first patent claim states:
In a treatment facility adapted for use with water wherein pollutants are
removed from the water and wherein waster exiting from the facility has
various acceptable and predetermined effluent quality parameters; said facility
including a plurality of operational sensors for operably determining process
water quality conditions while the water is in the facility; the improvement
comprising:
a) a monitoring computer at a site remote from said facility and
including software to receive data from said sensors, analyze the
water quality conditions inputted by said sensors and predict effluent
water quality and process upsets; said monitoring computer further
including an artificial neural network module to determine solutions
to actual and potential water quality and process upsets; and
b) an internet interface operably connecting said computer to said
sensors for transferring said process water quality conditions from
said sensors to said monitoring computer and transferring said
solutions from said monitoring computer to said facility.
Neochloris, Inc. v. Emerson Process Mgmt., LLLP, 140 F.Supp. 3d 763, 773 (N.D. Ill.
2015) (emphasis added).
Here, the lack of explainability refers to the “artificial neural network module” (an
AI-based tool), which utilizes an AI-method (an artificial neural network), and which the
district court found akin to a black box without any limitations on the system. As their
reasoning suggests, the interaction between the artificial neural network’s operation
would not be discernible to the relevant audience (even after reading the patent’s detailed
description). See id. Here, inscrutability refers to one’s inability to understand how or by
what method the water-quality information (AI-generated output, or data produced using
an AI-based tool) was produced. See id.
10. See Daniel Gervais, Exploring the Interfaces Between Big Data and Intellectual
Property Law, 10 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 22, 23 (2019)
(reviewing the application and reach of IP rights to AI and big data, including ways to
adapt IP rights, analysis of infringement of IP rights, the issue of right in AI and big data
itself, and incentives for additional rewards through an assessment of patent, copyright,
sui generis database rights, data exclusivity, and trade secrets); Brian S. Haney, AI
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inventorship11 and non-obviousness,12 this Article addresses the
prevailing gap and understudied phenomenon of AI disclosure. It claims
that AI fundamentally challenges disclosure in patent law (“patent
disclosure”), which has not kept up with rapid advancements in AI
technology, and seeks to invigorate the goals that patent law’s disclosure
function is thought to serve for society.
To understand the theories, normative assessments, and
prescriptions of this Article, some preliminary examples are helpful.
Businesses are increasingly identifying and utilizing some form of AI in
developing or delivering goods and services. Even those whose business
is driven primarily by customer experience rather than technology are
leveraging AI. AI is infiltrating virtually all business sectors and
Patents: A Data Driven Approach, 19 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. (forthcoming 2020);
Brian S. Haney, Patents for NLP Software: An Empirical Review, 22 N.C.J.L. & TECH.
(forthcoming 2020); Ana Ramalho, Patentability of AI-Generated Inventions: Is a
Reform of the Patent System Needed?, INST. INTELL. PROP., FOUND. FOR INTELL. PROP.
JAPAN, 2018, at 1, 2, https://bit.ly/3eq7O8K (assessing international harmonization of the
inventive step in response to AI-generated inventions); Hyunjong Ryan Jin, Think Big!
The Need for Patent Rights in the Era of Big Data and Machine Learning, 7 N.Y.U. J.
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 78, 81 (2018) (assessing whether patents are needed in an era of
AI and big data, while determining how to apply patent protection in AI); Charlotte A.
Tschider, Presentation at Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at DePaul University
College of Law: Patenting Artificial Intelligence (Aug. 8, 2019), https://bit.ly/38HXAyT.
11. See W. Michael Schuster, Artificial Intelligence and Patent Ownership, 75
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1945 (2018) (utilizing a law and economics approach by
employing the Coase Theorem to analyze how the United States Patent & Trademark
Office should grant AI patents); Shlomit Yanisky Ravid & Xiaoqiong Liu, When
Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: The 3A Era and an Alternative Model
for Patent Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2218, 2223, 2232–39 (2018) (responding to
challenges arising from patent law’s inventor-identification requirement by using a
“Multiplayer Model” to show that AI presents a realm with multiple stakeholders with
varying interests); Robin Feldman & Nick Thieme, Competition at the Dawn of Artificial
Intelligence, at 3 (U.C. HASTINGS SCH. L., LEGAL STUD., Research Paper No. 298, 2018)
(proposing, in response to AI, that “inventorship could be assigned to the humans, to both
humans and the computers, exclusively to the computers, or to no one at all”); Abbott,
supra note 1 (suggesting that creative computers that utilize AI should be considered
inventors based on the Patent and Copyright Clause of the United States).
12. See Ryan Abbott, Everything Is Obvious, 66 UCLA L. REV. 2, 8 (2018)
(suggesting that as AI technology improves, the bar for non-obviousness will be raised,
and when taken to the extreme, the non-obviousness doctrine will lose importance since
inventions themselves will become obvious to AI-based machines); Patric M. Reinbold,
Taking Artificial Intelligence Beyond the Turing Test, WIS. L. REV., Apr. 15, 2020, at 1
(proposing a standard for AI obviousness inquiries that “accounts for the inventor’s
objectives, access to big and deep data, and knowledge of the existing datasets to control
the form and operation of the machine learning resulting in AI-assisted inventions”). See
generally Liza Vertinsky, Thinking Machines and Patent Law, in 18 RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo
eds., 2018) (labeling AI as a “thinking machine” to suggest that patent law faces a
conceptual disconnect challenge, doctrinal challenges, and practical issues that
necessitate patentability policy responses, including whether the person-having-ordinaryskill-in-the-art standard should be modified to include such “thinking machines”).
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performing numerous functions, and has been popularized by its use in
Amazon Go’s cashier-less grocery store,13 Google Deep Mind’s
AlphaGo system’s win over a world-champion “Go” player,14 IBM’s
Watson’s win in Jeopardy!,15 and numerous virtual assistants, including
Apple’s Siri and Amazon’s Alexa.16 Examples of the pervasive use of AI
are well-known by the media and consumers, pose new types of
challenges in commerce, and raise new scholarly debate on how AI will
impact the law.17 The proliferation of AI in the invention process and at
the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) may be less
known but presents similar challenges for patent law and for society.18
Consider two case studies as patent-law application examples that
demonstrate the urgency for a fresh look at disclosure theory in patent
law and necessitate a response to the problems posed by the lack of
13. See Vishrut Shivkumar & Rishab Mehta, Amazon Go: The Future of Retail, 3
INT’L. J. ACAD. RES. & DEV. 646, 646 (2018) (describing the use of AI, specifically deep
learning computer vision combined with sensor fusion for Amazon’s cashless, automated
supermarket as “a type of store which has fast checkouts and few employees [with] quick
service and advanced consumer technology [where] anyone can lift a product off [the
store’s] shelves, walk over to the checkout counter which is automated, scan their phones
at the scanner and an online transaction takes place”).
14. See David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks
and Tree Search, 529 NATURE 484, 484–89 (2016) (stating, “[t]he game of Go has long
been viewed as the most challenging of classic games for artificial intelligence due to its
enormous search space and the difficulty of evaluating board positions and moves,” and
further explaining how “[t]his is the first time that a computer program has defeated a
human professional player in the full-sized game of Go, a feat previously thought to be at
least a decade away”); AlphaGo, DEEPMIND, https://bit.ly/3gq26Wx (last visited Jan. 7,
2020) (“AlphaGo is the first computer program to defeat a professional human Go player,
the first to defeat a Go world champion, and is arguably the strongest Go player in
history.”).
15. See Louise Beltzung, Watson Jeopardy! A Thinking Machine, VIENNA U. TECH.,
Dec. 2013, at 1, 2, 4–7 (describing IBM’s Watson win in Jeopardy!, where Watson’s use
of AI resulted in its victory over two human Jeopardy! champions over a span of three
days, as an example of the AI domain); David Ferrucci et al., Building Watson: An
Overview of DeepQA Project, AI MAGAZINE, Fall 2010, at 59, 77 (explaining that IBM
Research built an AI system capable of “performing at human expert levels in terms of
precision, confidence, and speed” in real time on Jeopardy!).
16. See Daniel Castro & Joshua New, The Promise of Artificial Intelligence, CTR.
FOR NEW DATA INNOVATION, Oct. 2016, at 2, 3.
17. See Giuseppe Contissa et al., Towards Consumer-Empowering Artificial
Intelligence, INT’L JOINT CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ORG., 2018, at 5150, 5150–
51 (suggesting that the current and pervasive use of AI challenges consumer law since
“consumer data [is] continuously collected by on-line and off-line consumer behavior
tracking . . . [to] elicit further information about consumers through profiling [leading to]
. . . attempts to influence their behaviour”).
18. See Feroz Ali, Digitalised Invention, Decentralised Patent System: The Impact
of Blockchain and Artificial Intelligence on the Patent Prosecution, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & INTELL. PROP., June 1, 2020, at 1–2, 16–18, 22 (asserting that artificial
intelligence has transformed the representation of the invention before the patent office
and has influenced the standards of patent prosecution by introducing a digital
representation of the invention that changes the foundation of the entire patent system).
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transparency of AI. These examples demonstrate how AI is rapidly
destabilizing patent law’s disclosure theory—first, an AI-based tool for
computational experimentation19 to generate AI-generated output of
nanomaterial compounds and, second, an AI-based tool for predicting
AI-generated output of optimized cooking recipes for personalized
nutrition. The first case study stems from the turn of the twentieth
century when chemical companies handled research and development for
new compounds in essentially the same manner as they did at the turn of
the nineteenth century; scientists and technicians would spend countless
years experimenting in the laboratory, collecting data from the
experiments, and making changes to reactions in hopes of making a
particular compound. This process was labor-intensive and costly, and,
while it entailed some scientific intuition, it involved much trial and
error. Computational chemistry companies, such as Schrödinger,20 and
other innovative startups identified and solved this problem by
computationally designing chemicals with AI-based tools to produce AIgenerated output that could be claimed in the form of optimal
performance, properties, and structures of compounds without running
physical experiments.21 A patent examiner assessing patent claims based
on the AI-generated output would be unable to determine that an
inventor utilized an AI-based tool without adequate disclosure but could
grant the inventor an early patent grant.22
The second case study concerns AI-based tools that have moved
beyond optimization to iteratively improve parameters to enable a
personalized solution, which is more difficult and involves many more
variables. Digital health companies, such as Yummly,23 and innovative
startups are developing AI-based tools that can be patented and can
generate AI-generated output of personalized recipes tailored to a
particular individual’s diet, allergens, and biological characteristics.
However, the rise in available computing power and sources of data, the
scale and plethora of new use cases, and the ability to use developments
19. See Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, Computational Experimentation, 21 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 591, 601–03 (2019) (describing techniques such as (1) molecular dynamics
simulations and machine learning, which allow for the determination of reactivity and
kinetics of chemical compounds; (2) high-precision, pre-laboratory-experiment
simulations and predictions of chemical properties and reactions; and (3) construction of
structure-activity relationships).
20. See Schrödinger Announces Closing of Initial Public Offering, BUSINESS WIRE
(Feb. 10, 2020, 4:05 PM), https://bwnews.pr/3cbU4gg.
21. See Ebrahim, supra note 19, at 595–96.
22. See Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1071 (2007) (suggesting that embryonic inventions that result in
early-granted patents present great concerns for underdevelopment).
23. See Ingrid Lunden, Whirlpool Acquires Yummly, The Recipe Search Engine
Last Valued at $100M, TECHCRUNCH (May 4, 2017, 9:54 AM), https://tcrn.ch/3c4M2Gc.
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in algorithms to perform complex computations and provide
customization neither enable a person having ordinary skill in the art
(“PHOSITA”) to practice the invention24 nor prove that the inventor was
in possession of the invention at the time of the patent application.25 In
both case studies, patents benefit the innovative AI companies and their
inventors but also present new challenges for the theoretical justifications
and economic theories of the patent system. Specifically, the use of AI in
the process of inventing increases the scale of and lack of transparency in
inventing, possibly resulting in premature patent grants or ones where the
inventor arguably was not in possession of the invention.
The traditional justifications26 for patents are based on ex ante labor
theory and reward theory.27 The utilitarian economic theory for patents is
based on incentives, such that innovation would be at suboptimal levels

24. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018); Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. v. Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc., 583 F. 3d 1317, 1320–23 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Sean B. Seymore, Foresight Bias
in Patent Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1105, 1115 (2015); Sean B. Seymore,
Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA. L. REV. 127, 137 (2008);
Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1066–67 (2014); Sean
B. Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
278, 279 (2008).
25. See Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Ariad Pharm.,
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010); MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan.
2018) § 2163 (explaining that a patent applicant must show possession of the claimed
invention, which can be done with such “descriptive means as words, structures, figures,
diagrams, and formulas that fully set forth the claimed invention” or by a “description of
an actual reduction to practice” or by demonstrating that the invention was “ready for
patenting”); Alan L. Durham, Patent Scope and Enablement in Rapidly Development
Arts, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1099, 1105 (2016); Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and
Obviousness as Possession, 65 EMORY L.J. 987, 990–91 (2016); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Possession in Patent Law, SMU L. REV., Winter 2006, at 123, 158.
26. See M. Du Bois, Justificatory Theories for Intellectual Property Viewed
Through the Constitutional Prism, PER/PELJ, Mar. 16 2018, at 1, 2, 21 (suggesting that
“where the dissemination of information is promoted by the grant of intellectual property
rights, the reward theory seems appropriate” but recognizing that some newer theories
may be justified by unconventional forms of intangible property interests); Adam
Karbowski & Jacek Prokop, Controversy Over the Economic Justifications for Patent
Protection, PROCEDIA ECON. & FIN. 5, 2013, at 393–94 (pointing out, while reviving the
debate on the economic justifications for patent protection, that the main justifications of
an inventor’s right to patent protection include “natural law, reward in the form of a
monopoly, incentives created by the monopoly profits, and compensation for revealing
the secret”); Wendy Lim, Towards Developing a Natural Law Jurisprudence in the U.S.
Patent System, SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J., May 2003, at 559, 561; A.
Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The Not-Quite Holy Grail, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 269 (1996).
27. See Reto M. Hilty et al., Intellectual Property Justification for Artificial
Intelligence 4 (MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INNOVATION & COMPETITION, Research Paper No.
20-02, 2020) (suggesting that the labor theory allows people to own property rights based
on the fruits of their labor and that the reward theory refers to providing enough reward to
inventors to recover their innovation costs).
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absent the incentives.28 Scholars have introduced other justifications and
economic reasoning for the patent system,29 and each has shed a new
perspective on the consequences of the scope, duration, or enforcement
of patents, as well as commercial influence. The traditional and more
modern justifications and theories for the patent system30 are not
mutually exclusive and, surprisingly, scholars have paid little attention to
the role of disclosure in the patent system’s treatment of AI inventions.
As technological advances in information and data have made it easier
for inventors to mask and obfuscate their innovations,31 and as patent law
has doctrinally moved away from its historical origins in the physical
world,32 disclosure theory has been brought to the forefront.33 As the
USPTO grants more patents covering AI-based tools34 as a policy goal,35
28. See Jay P. Kesan, Economic Rationale for the Patent System in the Current
Context, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 897, 898–99 (2015).
29. See J. Janewa Osei-Tutu, Humanizing Intellectual Property: Moving Beyond the
Natural Rights Property Focus, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 207, 210 (2017)
(introducing a human rights framework for intellectual property law); Peter Lee, Towards
a Distributive Agenda for U.S. Patent Law, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 321, 323, 325 (2017)
(suggesting that distributive justifications, such as providing access to inventions and
serving marginalized communities, are consonant with and advance the normative
foundations of the U.S. patent system); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Hidden Though
Flourishing Justification of Intellectual Property Laws: Distributive Justice, National
Versus International Approaches, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2, 17–18 (2017)
(suggesting that intellectual property law embodies distributive justice principles and
justifications by proposing that intellectual property and distributive justice are “born
together” and can “get along” in harmony).
30. See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011)
(providing foundation for justifying intellectual property by describing theories by Locke
and Kant, considering distributive justice and redistribution, and tying together disparities
and bridging different foundational viewpoints).
31. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Meagan MacGarvie, The Private Value of Software
Patents, 39 RES. POL’Y 994, 1003–05 (2010) (summarizing critique of information and
software patenting, including being of low quality, lacking adequate prior art, not
including source code implementation, and being vague and broadly worded).
32. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Physicalism and Patent Theory, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1543, 1545 (2016).
33. See Ali, supra note 18, at 29–30 (stating that the use of AI and machine learning
to produced “digitalized invention[s]” will allow for disclosure to “not [be] used
strategically and done by the user”).
34. See DEAN ALDERUCCI ET AL., CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., MAPPING THE
MOVEMENT OF AI INTO THE MARKETPLACE WITH PATENT DATA 3 (2019),
https://bit.ly/2ARSnru; Michael S. Borella et al., Artificial Intelligence-based Patents:
Perspectives for Practitioners and Patent Owners, MCDONNELL BOEHNEN HULBERT &
BERGHOFF LLP: SNIPPETS, 2019, at 8, 8, https://bit.ly/2ZztxqW (demonstrating with
Figure 1 “AI/ML-based Patent Publications by Year (USPTO)” rapidly increasing patent
activity in AI technologies).
35. See Tom Simonite, Despite Pledging Openness, Companies Rush to Patent AI
Tech, WIRED (July 31, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2ZxAJ6Q; ALDERUCCI ET AL.,
supra note 34, at 4–5 (pointing out policy considerations based on the impact of AI on
labor demand and wages, future wages, and employment); Remarks by Director Iancu at
the AI Event, supra note 3 (“AI has significant implications for intellectual property law,
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and since AI is fundamentally transforming patentability36 with complex
and nonintuitive algorithms37 to produce AI-generated output, society
needs inventors to provide greater disclosure of AI in patents. More
precisely, nonintuitive data relationships between AI-based tools and AIgenerated output should compel AI inventors to strive for greater patent
disclosure.38
Disclosure refers to patents being awarded as the quid pro quo for
disclosing the invention through enablement and written description.39
Patent disclosure is a theory that underlies the statutory requirements of
demonstrating enablement and written description, and an invention must
satisfy both the enablement and written description requirements to meet
patentability.40 A patent examiner may reject patent claims that, due to a
the economy, and America’s position as the global innovation leader. . . . Not
surprisingly, AI is changing the landscape of intellectual property policy.”).
36. See generally Ben Hattenbach & Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinite
Monkeys and Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 32 (2015) (suggesting that
AI-generated inventions raise important patent law questions on patent protection without
human intervention, while assessing whether technologies invented by AI techniques are
worthy of patent protection); Charles Duan, Patenting Artificial Intelligence Inventions,
R STREET (Nov. 13, 2019), https://bit.ly/30CUJp0 (providing normative
recommendations for Congressional policy changes for AI patenting, in response to the
USPTO’s request for comments on AI inventions); Telephone Interview with Sikander
Khan, Attorney, Haynes Beffel & Wolfeld (Oct. 3, 2019) (addressing patentability
concerns in patent law practice raised by a number of technology clients for whom AI is a
critical and core part of business); FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 1 (suggesting
patentability implications and changes are paramount in the face of AI’s rapid
technological changes in order for the U.S. patent system to achieve its objectives);
Ramalho, supra note 10 (suggesting that the substitution of human ingenuity in the
invention process or generating inventions without much human input requires
recalibrating patentability).
37. See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Clearing Opacity Through Machine
Learning, 106 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
38. See DISCOVER #OXFORDAI: THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD GUIDE TO ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 5–6 (U. of Oxford, 2d ed. 2019); see also DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM ET
AL.,
GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 75 (2020); Roman V. Yampolskiy, Unexplainability and
Incomprehensibility of Artificial Intelligence (June 20, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://bit.ly/3dQSB0G.
39. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 546 (2009)
(explaining that the technical layer in the patent specification describes the invention, that
the written description “ensures that the inventor is in possession of the claimed
invention,” and that enablement requires the patent applicant to “demonstrate in the
specification to ‘any person skilled in the [relevant] art [how] . . . to make and use the
[invention] without undue experimentation’”); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents
Disclose Useful Information, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 537 (2012) (referencing the
Federal Circuit, which has reaffirmed that the written description requirement is separate
from enablement, and that “the test for sufficiency [of written description] is whether the
disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art
that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date”).
40. See Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 178, 179 (2005).
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lack of enablement or written description for an invention, are not
reproducible by a person having ordinary skill in the art. While scholars
have recognized that patent disclosure has an interrelated nature of
teaching others and limiting patent claim scope,41 another skeptic has
argued that patent disclosure is an ancillary feature that conflicts with
incentives to invent and commercialize.42 Previous scholarship debated
the justifications of disclosure in patent law, but both viewpoints agree
that disclosure could be improved in the patent system and would
increase social welfare.43 Information and software-technology inventors
need to disclose more accurate information about the underlying
invention44 and have been criticized for their use of vague “patent-speak”
jargon.45 Rather than focus on the debate surrounding the justification for
disclosure in the patent system and lament the inherent opacity46
problems in disclosing information and software technologies,47 this
Article asks: given existing U.S. interests in patenting AI in general48—
41. See Jason Rantanen, Patent Law’s Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
369, 370–71 (2013).
42. See Allan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 404 (2010).
43. See Colleen V. Chien, Contextualizing Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1849, 1860–61 (2016) (quoting surveys that demonstrate that patent disclosure
disseminates technical information in society); Devlin, supra note 42, at 411–12; Fromer,
supra note 39, at 597 (explaining that “disclosure should increase social welfare because
inventors provide the information they already possess and outsiders need not try to learn
about the invention on their own”); Miller, supra note 40, at 196.
44. See Hall & MacGarvie, supra note 31, at 9–11 (describing the critique of
software patentability, explaining that the perception of software patents is that the
disclosure function is badly served since they rarely include the source code
implementation and are often vaguely and broadly worded).
45. See Robin Feldman, Plain Language Patents, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 289,
292–93 (2009) (characterizing patent law’s word interpretation as an “arcane code,”
“downright incomprehensible under common sense notions of language,” and “code-like
communication”); Devlin, supra note 42, at 403 (characterizing patents in the
information technology industry as being notorious for their vague language).
46. See Simon Chesterman, Through a Glass, Darkly: Artificial Intelligence and
The Problem of Opacity 1–26 (Nat’l Univ. of Sing., Working Paper No. 2020/011, 2020)
https://bit.ly/30BQavc (suggesting that as computer programs become more complex, the
ability to understand a given output diminishes).
47. See generally Sylvia Lu, Algorithmic Opacity, Private Accountability, and
Corporate Social Disclosure in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 23 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 1 (forthcoming 2021) (summarizing the conflict between algorithmic opacity
and democratic transparency in incentives for information disclosures of AI algorithms).
48. See Andrei Iancu, AI Policy Update, USPTO (Feb. 6, 2020) [hereinafter Iancu
AI Policy Update] (“One of the [USPTO’s] top priorities is to ensure that the United
States maintains its leadership in . . . AI. To that end, the USPTO has been actively . . .
promot[ing] the predictability and reliability of IP rights relating to AI technology . . . .”);
Exec. Order No. 13859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb. 11, 2019); NATIONAL SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, THE NATIONAL
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLAN: 2019 UPDATE,
at iii (June 2019) (specifying that the U.S. has made “concerted efforts to promote and
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or more specifically with AI-based tools and of AI-generated output—
should society want to enforce more robust AI disclosure requirements,
and if so, how? More specifically, as AI inventions magnify disclosure
problems of information and software technologies with insufficient
transparency, are our current disclosure requirements sufficient for
patentability of AI-based tools, and are changes in patent examination
necessary in response to calls for stronger disclosure of AI-generated
output?
The USPTO has recognized the importance of patent disclosure as
AI patent filings have rapidly increased and comprise a significant
portion of identified inventions, as reflected in the USPTO Director’s
comments and disclosure-related question: “We know that . . . AI . . . is
included in more than one-third of all identified inventions. . . . What
level of detail is necessary in a patent disclosure as to the structure and
function [of the underlying inner workings]?”49 Moreover, Brenda Simon
and Ted Sichelman’s 2019 article, Data-Generating Patents,50
introduced the term “data-generating patents” to refer to patents on
technologies that generate valuable data by their operation or use while
exploring the use of patents and trade secrets as complements. The
authors recognized that patent disclosure requirements are not always
rigorous, but their analysis did not explore the relation between data
generation, such as by AI-based tools, and adequate disclosure of their
protect AI technology and innovation,” with eight strategic priorities that include a desire
to: (1) “[m]ake long-term investments in AI research”; (2) “[d]evelop effective methods
for human-AI collaboration”; (3) “[u]nderstand and address the ethical, legal, and societal
implications for AI”; (4) “[e]nsure the safety and security of AI systems”; (5) “[d]evelop
shared public databases and environments for AI training and testing”; (6) “[m]easure
and evaluate AI technologies through standards and benchmarks”; (7) “[b]etter
understand the national AI R&D workforce needs”; and (8) “[e]xpand public-private
partnerships to accelerate advances in AI”); ALDERUCCI ET AL., supra note 34, at 3–4
(alluding to the national strategic interest of AI by providing evidence and statistics that
“the U.S. is the overwhelmingly dominant source of AI invention” and noting that “U.S.based inventors account for an overwhelming majority of granted AI patents”); Simonite,
supra note 35.
49. Andrei Iancu, Remarks by Director Iancu at the International Conference on AIEmerging Technologies and IP, USPTO (July 16, 2019). The USPTO Director further
stated:
AI published applications grew by 400% in the past decade. At the USPTO, AI
technologies are part of about 26% of annual patent filings, which is a 34%
increase in the share of AI patent filings since 2005. And we have doubled the
number of examiners at the USPTO reviewing AI applications.
Id.
50. See Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW. L.
REV. 377, 377–78 (2019) (introducing the term “data-generating patents” to refer to
“patents over inventions that generate unique data from users” and that with such
“inventions involving technologies that by design generate valuable data through their
operation or use,” the result being that the patentee also effectively “enjoys market power
over the data generated by the invention”).
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application to produce AI-generated output. Additionally, the USPTO
and the U.S. Supreme Court51 have recognized the importance of patent
disclosure, but these views only address the importance of greater and
clearer disclosure of identified inventions. Their views do not address the
challenge of AI-based tools and AI-generated output that could provide
unidentified inventions52 (inventions based on AI-generated output but
that appear as if they were invented by humans without use of AI-based
tools), which, as this Article subsequently explains in more depth, stems
from the transparency challenge of AI.
This Article argues that the lack of transparency in AI-based tools
that produce AI-generated output results in unidentified AI inventions. In
particular, it asserts that explainability and inscrutability have normative
ramifications for the adequacy of disclosure of the inner workings of AIbased tools and the inventive method of AI-generated output. There are
underappreciated benefits of patent disclosure of AI inventions, but they
require evaluation of the marginal costs relative to the marginal benefits.
In exploring patent disclosure of AI inventions, this Article also analyzes
the related issues of whether current patent examination at the USPTO
should evolve from the standpoint of AI capabilities53 and detection of
adequate disclosure.54 The issue of the USPTO’s patent examination of
AI inventions is largely derivative of the normative ramifications of AI
disclosure required for inventors and stems from the possibility of patent
applicants flooding the USPTO with unidentified inventions.55 The
normative implications of patent disclosure of AI inventions are a
response to the proliferation of AI inventions and the question of how
society should develop a better understanding of interaction of patent law
with AI. This Article analyzes whether and how a lack of AI
transparency undermines the interrelated teaching and scope-limiting
purposes of patent disclosure56 and will stretch patent examination to its
breaking point both conceptually and practically. On a prescriptive level,
51. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
52. See infra Section I.B (defining “unidentified inventions” as inventions based on
AI-generated output but that appear as if they were invented by humans without use of
AI-based tools).
53. See Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, Automation & Predictive Analytics in Patent
Prosecution: USPTO Implications & Policy, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1185, 1185, 1189
(2019) (prescribing that “the USPTO should develop a counteracting artificial
intelligence unit in response to artificial-intelligence proliferation[,]” in part, “based on
economic efficiency views [that] would impact fairness, time, and transparency policy
considerations”).
54. See Ebrahim, supra note 19, at 650.
55. See Ebrahim, supra note 53, at 1236, 1239, 1242.
56. See Rantanen, supra note 41, 370–71, 373–74 (explaining that a reason for
patent law’s disclosure requirement is to “limit the maximum scope of patent claims [by]
establish[ing] the outer boundaries of what the applicant might claim”).
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it argues that disclosure of the inventive method, such as the use of AI
tools for production of AI-generated output, is wholly appropriate and
advances the patent system’s objectives. In so arguing, it sketches the
contours of an enhanced disclosure for AI inventions.
Turning wholly to the prescriptive, this Article proposes
recommendations for improving the patent system’s promotion of
disclosure of AI inventions in multiple contexts, including disclosure
incentives and a deposit requirement. It asserts that enhanced AI
disclosure could be achieved through patent policy calibrations, starting
with voluntary disclosure and continuing with increased disclosure
incentives. Such incentives range from: (1) prioritized examination to (2)
reduced maintenance fees to (3) greater patent terms to enable longer
patent protection to (4) a working model requirement as a prerequisite
for a complete patent application. In important ways, the adequacy of
disclosure of AI inventions depends on one’s normative vision of
sufficient quid pro quo. Policymakers may regard incentivizing greater
disclosure of an AI method of invention as posing greater costs for patent
examination and for the inventor, yet it may prevent a socially harmful
tragedy of the anticommons57 with unclear competing rights to upstream
training data58 and algorithms that could prevent downstream
innovation.59

57. See Michale A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at 698, 698
(defining a “tragedy of the anticommons” as when “a resource is prone to underuse when
multiple owners can each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no
one has an effective privilege of use”); Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons,
A Concise Introduction, 76 MODERN L. REV., Jan. 2, 2013, at 1, 6 (specifying that the
tragedy of the anticommons thesis is “when too many people own pieces of one thing,
nobody can use it . . . [and the result is] wasteful underuse. . . . [C]ooperation breaks
down, wealth disappears, and everybody loses”); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621,
622 (1998) (defining a “tragedy of the anticommons” as “[w]hen too many owners hold
such privileges of use[] [such that] the resource is prone to overuse” and when “multiple
owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no
one has an effective privilege of use[,]” and further suggesting that “difficulties of
overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that policymakers should pay more
attention to the content of the property bundles”); see also note 59 and accompanying
text.
58. See Phillip Hacker, A Legal Framework for AI Training Data, 13 L.,
INNOVATION & TECH. (forthcoming 2021) (stating that training data is of fundamental
importance for the development of AI applications). For a more detailed understanding of
the term “training data,” see ROBERT MUNRO & QAZALEH MIRSHARIF, THE ESSENTIAL
GUIDE TO TRAINING DATA 10 (Figure Eight) (ebook) (explaining training data for AI as,
“[AI] machines learn examples (a.k.a. training data); training data is an important—if not
more important—than the algorithm itself[,]” and that “high quality and high quantities
of training data are the surest way to improve models; training data needs labeling to be
truly useful; and training data labeled by humans is the most accurate way to do this”);
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This Article advances legal scholarship on AI and makes a number
of novel contributions. First, it unravels the black box of AI by providing
a detailed description and taxonomy of AI in patenting and includes
graphical representations that identify a typology with resulting policy
arguments. Second, it introduces the notion of unidentified inventions in
the form of AI-generated output and associated normative inquiries
concerning patent or trade secret protection for innovators. Third, it
applies theories, justifications, and normative assessments of disclosure
to AI to explain the benefits of enhanced AI patent disclosure, while
responding to objections. Fourth, it prescribes incentivizing enhanced AI
patent disclosure and distinguishes procedural reform at the USPTO and
legislative reform. Fifth, it concludes with a description of a future
proposed empirical study to verify the theoretical, normative, and
prescriptive underpinnings of this Article. Sixth, and as applied to
broader AI legal scholarship, the underlying problematic social effects of
AI identified in this Article extend beyond patent disclosure and into
similar forces that scholars have investigated with copyright law60 and
trademark law.61
This Article unfolds in three parts. Part I briefly introduces AI
technology through a taxonomy comprising of AI-based tools and AIgenerated output. Furthermore, Part I introduces AI’s transparency
Training and Test Sets: Splitting Data, GOOGLE MACHINE LEARNING CRASH COURSE,
https://bit.ly/3gz6x1a (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
59. The tragedy of the anticommons refers to a type of coordination breakdown in
which there is single resource with numerous rightsholders that prevent others from using
that single resource, such that it would frustrate a socially desirable outcome. In other
words, there are competing rights, such as with patents, so that people underuse scarce
resources, since there are too many owners that block each other. As it relates to AI, the
single resource is training data; if too many people owned pieces of the training data, then
nobody would use algorithms used to apply the training data. The result would be
wasteful underuse since the ownership rights and regulatory controls would be too
fragmented. The analogy of the tragedy of the anticommons is particularly pronounced
with AI as explained in this Article, since the application of AI-based tools is “hidden”
and would result in AI-generated output that would be hard to spot.
60. See Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 283, 288
(2019) (examining algorithmic mediation of copyright exceptions and exploring the
implications of incorporating legal standards into algorithms, and arguing that social
action of algorithmic systems may become the legal standards that they seek to
implement); Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Fair Learning 1–64 (Mar. 23, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://bit.ly/2ZLVqff (arguing that AI should be able to use
training databases regardless of whether the contents of those databases are copyrighted);
Gervais, supra note 10, at 22, 25–27, 38 (suggesting that copyright’s traditional role is
challenged by AI, given the unstructured nature of non-relational databases).
61. See Sonia Katyal & Aniket Kesari, Trademark Search, Artificial Intelligence,
and the Role of the Private Sector, 35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2020)
(discussing the impact of AI on private trademark search engines and their economic and
legal implications and demonstrating that AI fundamentally transforms the trademark
ecosystem through an empirical investigation of various search engines).
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problem by describing how patent law’s disclosure requirement is
challenged by the concepts of explainability of an AI-based tool’s
operation and inscrutability of AI-generated output.
Part II introduces disclosure’s function in the patent system. It then
describes the normative debate between disclosure proponents and a
skeptic and over disclosure’s effects on social goals. The normative
balance will be challenging if, as some believe, AI technology advances
such that AI displaces humans from the inventive process with an
accelerating pace of innovation toward artificial general intelligence.62
Part II argues that AI, unlike other forms of software, lacks
reproducibility due to its dynamic black-box63 nature, thus creating a
disclosure deficit. Furthermore, Part II provides a normative assessment
of greater AI patent disclosure on patentability and for patent
examination. Part II ends with theoretical justifications of AI patent
disclosure and introduces normative reasoning for enhanced AI
disclosure.
Part III explores mechanisms for enhancing disclosure of AI-based
tools and AI-generated output. It proposes prescriptions to fix the
disclosure function of patents—including disclosure incentives and a
data deposit requirement to provide patent protections. In so doing, it

62. See FOTIOS FITSILIS, IMPOSING REGULATION ON ADVANCED ALGORITHMS, at v
(2019) (defining “artificial general intelligence” as “the broader goal of reaching humanlike intelligence, rather than a single technology, or bunch of technologies . . . through the
inception of intelligent algorithms”); John Linarelli, Advanced Artificial Intelligence and
Contract, UNIFORM L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUES ON TRANSNAT’L COM. L. & TECH./DIGITAL
ECON.) (forthcoming 2019), https://bit.ly/3iOr6YA (introducing artificial general
intelligence, or AGI, as the displacement of the human in the innovation process by
explaining that “AI cognitive architecture (code or otherwise) [that] will become
something roughly analogous to ‘gene’ and AI evolution will occur independently of the
initial human intervention of AI creation,” but further noting that “AGI does not yet exist
[but] AGI will come to exist in the future”); Simon Deakin & Christopher Markou, Is
Law Computable? From Rule of Law to Legal Singularity 4 (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty
of L. Research Paper 2020), https://bit.ly/3gOjUKh (suggesting that “the AGI (artificial
general intelligence) hypothesis is that a machine can be designed to perform any
‘general intelligent action’ that a human is capable of”).
63. See W. Nicholson Price II, Artificial Intelligence in Health Care: Applications
and Legal Issues, 14 SCI. TECH. LAW, Fall 2017, at 10, 10 (describing AI as relying on
“algorithms [that] may be best described as black-box”) (emphasis added); see also JACK
BELZER ET AL., Models of Learning Systems, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 40 (Allen Kent et al. eds., 1978); James J. Anton et al., Policy Implications
of Weak Patent Rights, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 6 (2006) (defining
a “black-box invention” as one “for which the added performance is obvious when the
product or service is observed, but the means—the magic ingredients—by which the
performance is achieved cannot be readily discerned or reverse engineered”); Black-Box
Medicine: Legal and Ethical Issues: A Health Policy and Bioethics Consortium, PETRIEFLOM CTR. FOR HEALTH L. POL’Y, BIOTECH., & BIOETHICS AT HARV. L. SCH. (Feb. 8,
2019, 12:00 PM), https://bit.ly/2XfwCuo [hereinafter Black-Box Medicine] (describing
the “black box” of AI algorithms as opaque computational models that make decisions).
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assesses benefits and costs for the inventor, patent examination, and
society. Part III also builds a foundation for a more holistic AI
innovation law and policy framework by showing how the prescriptions
would impact the decision between patent protection and trade secrecy.
Furthermore, Part III argues that greater disclosure of AI-based tools and
AI-generated output is essential for growth of AI innovation and explains
how maximizing AI disclosure would promote aggregate welfare.
I.

FOUNDATIONS: HOW & WHY AI IS “ARTIFICIAL”

To understand the legal frameworks and normative implications of
inventions covering AI-based tools or application of them, it is vital to
understand the technological forces that have led to the contemporary use
of AI in patent law. This Part begins by describing how AI is “artificial”
by unraveling its “black box,”64 which serves as the technological force
for examining why AI produces “artificial” inventions. By providing a
taxonomy of AI, this Part demonstrates how AI-based tools are used in
the inventive process to produce AI-generated output without human
intervention and why such “artificial” inventing raises new
considerations for patent disclosure. A descriptive account of the
typologies of AI illuminates an understanding of its legal and normative
significance, as is seen in Parts II and III, respectively.
A. The “Magic” of AI
AI is not “magic,” but much has been written about AI as a sort of
magic and with futurist tones. The speculative discussion of AI is fraught
with unsupported assumptions and thus requires definition and
demystification. AI is difficult to define65 but generally refers to the use
of computing systems for automating tasks that would normally require
human intelligence.66 The varying definitions of AI diffused the concept
into meaningless buzz,67 and the definition also changed with time due to
rapid technological developments.68

64. See Nicholson Price, supra note 63, at 10; Black-Box Medicine, supra note 63.
65. See Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Case, You Might Be a Robot, 105 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (forthcoming 2020); Jonas Schuett, A Legal Definition of AI, at 1 (Sept. 4, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://bit.ly/3eARORC (stating that the term “artificial
intelligence” is highly ambiguous and has a vast spectrum of definitions to argue that
“there is no definition of AI which meets the requirements for legal definitions”).
66. See Asay, supra note 1, at 1187; Surden, supra note 1, at 1307 (describing AI as
using technology to automate tasks that normally require human intelligence).
67. See Foster Provost & Tom Fawcett, Data Science and Its Relationship to Big
Data and Data-Driven Decision Making, 1 BIG DATA at 51, 52 (2013).
68. See H.R. 4829, 115th Cong. (2018). Congress defined “artificial intelligence” as
anything that can:
(A) think like humans (including cognitive architectures and neural networks);
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AI is implemented by software technology,69 which raises the
question as to what distinguishes AI from run-of-the-mill software. AI
performs different functions from software since AI can imitate
intelligent behavior with computer programs.70 AI has been referred to as
being a “black box,”71 a “thinking machine,”72 and “a learning system.”73

(B) act like humans (such as passing the Turing test using natural language
processing, knowledge representation, automated reasoning, and learning);
(C) think rationally (such as logic solvers, inference, and optimization);
(D) act rationally (such as intelligent software agents and embodied robots that
achieve goals via perception, planning, reasoning, learning, communicating,
decision-making, and acting); or
(E) automate or replicate intelligent behavior.
Id.
See also Phillipe Aghion et al., Artificial Intelligence and Economic Growth (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23928, 2017) (defining AI as “the
capability of a machine to imitate intelligent human behavior [or] an agent’s ability to
achieve goals in a wide range of environments”); Roger Parloff, Why Deep Learning is
Suddenly Changing Your Life, FORTUNE (Sept. 28, 2016; 5:00 PM), https://bit.ly/3hoiffg
(defining “modern artificial intelligence” as “a vast range of technologies—like
traditional logic and rules-based systems—that enable computers and robots to solve
problems in ways that at least superficially resemble thinking”); FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD &
CHAE, supra note 1, at 5 (defining AI as “a computerized system exhibiting behavior
commonly thought of as requiring intelligence” or “a system capable of rationally solving
complex problems or taking appropriate action to achieve its goals in real-world
circumstances”); Semmler & Rose, supra note 1, at 86 (defining AI as “the process of
simulating human intelligence through machine processes”); Smith et al., supra note 1, at
4 (defining AI as “a system which amplifies people’s own knowledge and
understanding”).
69. See Andres Guadamuz Gonzalez, The Software Patent Debate, 1 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1, 2 (2006) (explaining that software is not only source code, but to be able to
operate in a computer, software has to be translated into object code by a process of
compilation).
70. See Joost N. Kok et al., Artificial Intelligence: Definitions, Trends, Techniques,
and Cases, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1, 1–2 (2009), https://bit.ly/3chsnD3. The
following definition of AI is based on The New International Webster’s Comprehensive
Dictionary of the English Language, Encyclopedic Edition:
An area of study in the field of computer science. Artificial intelligence is
concerned with the development of computers able to engage in human-like
thought processes such as learning, reasoning, and self-correction.
The concept that machines can be improved to assume some capabilities
normally thought to be like human intelligence such as learning, adapting, selfcorrection, etc.
The extension of human intelligence through the use of computers, as in
times past physical power was extended through the use of mechanical tools.
In a restricted sense, the study of techniques to use computers more
effectively by improved programming techniques.
Artificial intelligence, NEW INT’L WEBSTER’S COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG.
LANGUAGE (Encyc. ed. 1998).
71. See Nicholson Price, supra note 63, at 10; Black-Box Medicine, supra note 63.
72. See Liza Vertinsky & Todd M. Rice, Thinking About Thinking Machines:
Implications of Machine Inventors for Patent Law, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 574, 576–77
(2002) (discussing the growing use of computers to augment human capabilities and
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A subset of AI is machine learning,74 which is comprised of algorithms
that provide new insights without being programmed to do so.75
Scholarship and media anthropomorphize AI as an autonomous
76
actor with human cognitive functions,77 but AI is not divorced from
human control, and its intelligence is based on exceeding human
capacity.78 In fact, AI operates differently from the ways that humans
sense, learn, reason, and act.79 While some scholars have debated
whether AI’s unique features merit inventor status,80 the European Patent
Office81 and the USPTO have determined that AI cannot be an
inventor.82

replace human operators, as well as their effects on the invention process that cannot be
easily accommodated within the current patent system).
73. MARCEL DEKKER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 11,
at 24 (1978) (defining a “learning system” as “any system which uses information
obtained during one interaction with its environment to improve performance during
future interactions”).
74. Juan C. Mateos-Garcia, The Complex Economics of Artificial Intelligence 6
(Dec. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://bit.ly/2ZTRDge (stating that the
artificial intelligence system combines machine learning algorithms).
75. See Carlton E. Sapp, Preparing and Architecting for Machine Learning,
GARTNER RESEARCH (Jan. 17, 2017), https://gtnr.it/2MOolYs (further defining “machine
learning” as extracting knowledge or patterns from a series of observations; describing
that data is fed into a machine learning system, which uses the data to fit to algorithms to
solve a problem or derive an insight).
76. See Alicia Solow-Niederman, Administering Artificial Intelligence, S. CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020).
77. See Catalina Goanta et al., Back to the Future: Waves of Legal Scholarship on
Artificial Intelligence, in TIME, LAW, AND CHANGE, Oct. 23, 2019, at 1, 16.
78. See Finck, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that the capacity of AI has replaced human
decision-making in some circumstances).
79. See Mirjana Stankovic et al., Exploring Legal, Ethical and Policy Implications
of Artificial Intelligence 5 (L., Justice, and Dev., Working Paper 2017).
80. See Erica Fraser, Computers as Inventors—Legal and Policy Implications of
Artificial Intelligence on Patent Law, 13 SCRIPTED at 306, 324 (2016); Ryan Abbott, The
Artificial Inventor Project, WIPO MAGAZINE (Dec. 2019), https://bit.ly/30ClRoi
(suggesting that “no natural person, as traditionally defined, qualifies as an inventor”);
Michael McLaughlin, Computer-Generated Inventions, 101 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 224, 239–40 (2019) (proposing the establishment of categories of inventorship
based on representing various degrees of human intervention that may take place
throughout the inventive process); Abbott, supra note 1, at 1081 (arguing that AI has
created patentable inventions and that, but for the judicial characterization of invention as
a mental act, computers independently meet the requirements for inventorship); Yanisky
Ravid & Liu, supra note 11, at 2221–22 (summarizing various proposals made by
scholars and introducing an alternative approach for addressing inventions made by
artificial intelligence).
81. See EPO Publishes Grounds for Its Decision to Refuse Two Patent Applications
Naming a Machine as Inventor, EUROPEAN PAT. OFF. (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://bit.ly/2XnxZ9u (“[T]he EPO considered that the interpretation of the legal
framework of the European patent system leads to the conclusion that the inventor
designated in a European patent must be a natural person[,]” and “[m]oreover, the
designation of an inventor is mandatory as it bears a series of legal consequences, notably
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AI is a form of statistical inference83 that identifies correlations
within datasets84 to imitate human cognition and decision making.85
More specifically, AI is different from traditional statistical analysis
techniques where humans set up the analysis, specify which input
variables in the data set to consider, and decide how those variables put
together would yield an estimate of the outcome variable. By contrast, in
AI, humans do not specify how input variables are put together, and
instead, an algorithm tries many possible combinations of variables to
optimize a function, and in so doing, “learns” how to make a more
accurate prediction.86 Deep learning,87 which is the state-of-the-art of AI
and machine learning, emulates the biological brain with the use of
neural networks to process large amounts of data.88
to ensure that the designated inventor is the legitimate one and that he or she can benefit
from rights linked to this status”).
82. See U.S. Patent Application No. 16/524,350, Decision on Petition, 6 (filing date
July 29, 2019) (unpublished) (reasoning that the denied patent application named a
machine, “‘(Invention generated by artificial intelligence),’ as the inventor, and . . .
current statutes, case law, and USPTO regulations and rules limit inventorship to natural
persons,” and “U.S. patent law does not permit a machine to be named as the inventor in
a patent application”); Dennis Crouch, USPTO Rejects AI-Invention for Lack of a Human
Inventor, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 27, 2020), https://bit.ly/2TyWJKx.
83. See generally Christopher Eldred, AI and Domain Knowledge: Implications of
the Limits of Statistical Inference, BERKELEY ROUNDTABLE ON THE INT’L ECON., Oct.
2019 (describing AI’s fundamental nature as a form of statistical inference that serves as
an effective use for many kinds of problem domains).
84. See Angela Daly et al., Artificial Intelligence Governance and Ethics: Global
Perspectives 5 (June 28, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (describing AI as detecting
patterns in data and making predictions on the basis of such datasets, which requires
identification of correlations within the datasets).
85. See Osonde A. Osoba & Paul K. Davis, An Artificial Intelligence/Machine
Learning Perspective on Social Simulation 2 (RAND Corp., Working Paper 2018).
86. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic
Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2019).
87. See Maryam M. Najafabadi et al., Deep Learning Applications and Challenges
in Big Data Analytics, 2 J. BIG DATA 1, 7 (2015) (asserting that deep learning is more
powerful than statistics, since it can conduct difficult optimization tasks, extract non-local
and global relationships and patterns in data, and can apply relational and semantic
knowledge); Saptarshi Sengupta et al., A Review of Deep Learning with Special Emphasis
on Architectures, Applications, and Recent Trends, 10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS at 2, 5 (Mar.
2019) (explaining that artificial neural networks, which are utilized to perform deep
learning, refers to networks of interconnected hidden layers that are capable of
approximating a function that represents patterns in the data from multiple passes of data
through a learning procedure). See generally MICHAEL NIELSEN, NEURAL NETWORKS AND
DEEP LEARNING (2019) (explaining that unlike algorithms in other software technologies,
for which problems are broken into many small and precise tasks that a computer can
easily perform, deep learning learns from observation of data to provide a solution to the
problem at hand); TERRENCE J. SEJNOWSKI, THE DEEP LEARNING REVOLUTION (2018)
(describing the motivation for the field of deep learning, neural network architectures,
and deep learning’s impact now and in the years to come).
88. See Brian S. Haney, Deep Reinforcement Learning Patents: An Empirical
Survey 1, 4 (2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://bit.ly/2zpwmQs (noting that deep
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The benefits of AI over human capabilities stem from complexity,
efficiency, scale, and time. AI can detect patterns from a massive amount
of data and make predictions89 that may be undetectable to the human
brain. Additionally, AI is more sophisticated than other forms of
software because of its ability to improve models to yield better
predictions by analyzing many examples90 and iteratively feeding data
into an algorithm to improve output.91 Quite simply, accessibility of
computing power, advancements in algorithms and analytics, availability
of a massive amount of data, and new digitized use cases have presented
a new AI technological revolution.92 AI presents benefits over traditional
statistical inference techniques with its ability to discern useful patterns
in large data sets accurately, continuously, efficiently, and predictively.93
However, these advantages come with a cost of transparency, since the
combination of variables and the relationships between them is
extremely complex and non-intuitive.
The application of AI, such as inside of AI-based tools to produce
AI-generated output, produces some unpredictable94 results95 but is
learning is a new type of machine learning, and it concerns the acquisition of knowledge
from large amounts of data in a way that models the human brain, with machines to
process information).
89. See Matt Taddy, The Technological Elements of Artificial Intelligence, in THE
ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AN AGENDA, at 1 (Ajay Agrawal et al. eds.,
2019) (explaining that AI automates tasks previously done by humans and requires a
massive amount of data and continued data generation to detect patterns and make
predictions).
90. See MUNRO & MIRSHARIF, supra note 58, at 4, 6, 10.
91. See Semmler & Rose, supra note 1, at 86–87.
92. See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 1, at 5; see also Kimberly A.
Houser & Anjanette H. Raymond, It Is Time to Move Beyond the ‘AI Race’ Narrative:
Why Investment and International Cooperation Must Win the Day, NW. J. TECH &
INTELL. PROP. (forthcoming 2021) (“The reason for the notable advances in AI stem from
the recent availability of big data and cloud computing.”).
93. In simple terms, unlike traditional statistical techniques, state of the art of AI,
which is known as deep learning, is unstructured—data is fed in without constraints about
what the system should be looking for. The algorithms run, form connections between
different layers of data, test for connections, and find relationships in the unstructured
data that the machine learning programmer might not have ever thought to consider.
94. See Yanisky Ravid & Liu, supra note 11, at 2224–27 (suggesting that AI
systems, which are based on algorithms and data, are unpredictable and evolving;
specifying that AI systems produce “random mutations that result in unpredictable routes
to the optimal solution” and that AI systems “continue to evolve and change according to
new data” so as to “produce results that differ from the initial plan of the programmers or
operators of the system”).
95. This Article clarifies the meaning of “unpredictable” identified in other nontechnical AI literature to suggest that the trained weights themselves are unpredictable.
Weights (in the AI context) refer to an indicator of a mathematical strength that can be
explained by an example. Weights near zero mean that changing the input will not
change the output, and thus, many AI algorithms set the weight to zero, so as to simplify
the application of the AI. The AI-technological reasoning is: if the weights do change,
then the output would be unpredictable. In general, the weights would not change, since
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reproducible,96 contrary to non-technical AI literature.97 In other words,
AI inverts the traditional computer programming paradigm, where
mathematical functions take inputs to produce the desired output.
Instead, AI produces a learned function—an algorithm that produces the
lowest error and one that closely matches the inputs’ actual outputs—
when given a large enough set of inputs and outputs.98 Once a learned
function is produced, it can be used to make predictions on previously
unseen data.99 As applied to real-world examples, a learned function (that
is part of an algorithm inside of an AI-based tool) can silently improve
output of the quality of photos taken on a digital camera, help security
screeners detect anomalies at airports, detect financial fraud, and
improve online health results.100
The disclosure challenge with AI-based tools stems from the
inability to explain how the learned function (or algorithm) operates. The
disclosure challenge with the AI-generated output stems from being
unable to understand what algorithm method produced the particular
output. As this Article argues, such disclosure deficits necessitate
enhanced AI patent disclosure.

the goal of training is to obtain the best possible weights, so they can be reused. Since the
training process is expensive, one would not want to retrain and, as a result, the AIgenerated output should be predictable if the weights do not change. In other words,
when one starts with the same training data, then one will get the same training out each
time when the weights do not change.
96. See Eleanor Bird et al., The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence: Issues and
Initiatives, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., Mar. 2020, at 48; Cary
Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the
Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1210, 1213 (2017); Matthew Hutson,
Artificial Intelligence Faces Reproducibility Crisis, 359 SCIENCE, Feb. 16, 2018, at 725–
26; Joshua A. Kroll et. al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 659 (2017);
Yew-Soon Ong & Abhishek Gupta, Five Pillars of Artificial Intelligence Research, IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON EMERGING TOPICS IN COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 2019, at
411, 413, https://bit.ly/2EtPFKB (explaining that AI algorithms raise questions
concerning rationalizability, resilience, reproducibility, realism, and responsibility, and
further clarifying that reproducibility of AI systems refers to a replication crisis).
97. This Article takes issue with the reproducibility crisis identified in other nontechnical AI literature, and instead argues for reproducibility, while also acknowledging
the unpredictability problem. The AI-technological reasoning is: once a system is trained,
then weights are attained. If one were to restart the training, then one would be able to
arrive at the same point with all of the weight values from the original training. As a
result, the training process is reproducible and, thus, the AI-generated output should be
reproducible as well.
98. See Michael Borella, How to Draft Patent Claims for Machine Learning
Inventions, PATENT DOCS (Nov. 25, 2018), https://bit.ly/36PGGh3.
99. See Patentability of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Inventions in
Europe, WITHERS & ROGERS (Mar. 22, 2018), https://bit.ly/2ZXDNJB.
100. See Borella, supra note 98; Patentability of Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning Inventions in Europe, supra note 99.
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B. Transparency Viewed from a Taxonomy of AI
While AI provides new opportunities as a technological tool, it
presents challenges for administrative processes, whose public policy
objectives require transparency as a social contract ideal.101 Democratic
governments should require that the public assess the efficacy and
fairness of the governmental process.102 Transparency is integral to a fair
society and a legitimate government, and visibility of government
institutions is implicated in administrative law.103 The USPTO is an
administrative agency that issues patents to inventors, through a process
called patent prosecution, by examining patent applications and
determining whether the statutory requirements of patentability are
met.104 The prospect of inventors utilizing AI raises legal and policy
transparency questions for the USPTO.105
In general, AI presents a transparency paradox since requiring more
information about the underlying black box106 of AI creates benefits as
well as risks and costs.107 The USPTO has stressed that transparency is
important by stating, “[a]s a federal agency, it is important for the
USPTO to be able to explain all [patent] prosecution decisions made.
Because of this, solution capabilities must be transparent to the USPTO
and as well as to the general public. Black box solutions will not be
accepted.”108 From a normative standpoint, the USPTO should be able to
value transparency as a mechanism for improving patent disclosure. The
evaluation of this normative consideration requires assessing the use of
AI by inventors, including a taxonomy of AI and unraveling the black
box of AI.
A taxonomic exercise characterizes, classifies, and explains how AI
generates inventive output and, in so doing, presents transparency
considerations. Notably, there are different AI types, which fall on a
spectrum with varying degrees of human input, from capturing human
cognitive abilities to requiring some human input.109 Machine learning,
101. See Finck, supra note 5, at 6.
102. See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 5, at 109.
103. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 96, at 18–19.
104. See Ebrahim, supra note 53, at 1187, 1193–95.
105. See Rai, supra note 7, at 2638–40; Ebrahim, supra note 53, at 1189, 1230.
106. See BELZER ET AL., supra note 63, at 35 (describing components of a learning
system, or a black box); Nicholson Price, supra note 63, at 10; Black-Box Medicine,
supra note 63.
107. See Burt, supra note 5.
108. OFF. OF THE CHIEF INFO. OFFICER, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
USPTO’S CHALLENGE TO IMPROVE PATENT SEARCH WITH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI) 2 (2018).
109. See Rainer Mühlhoff, Human-Aided Artificial Intelligence: Or, How to Run
Large Computations in Human Brains? Toward a Media Sociology of Machine Learning,
NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y, Nov. 2019, at 1, 10 (characterizing human and AI interaction as
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which is a subset and type of AI, is comprised of software programs that
can learn from experience and improve their performance with time.110
Machine learning111 utilizes algorithms to change its output based on new
data,112 and “the entire process relies on the analysis of data” with several
stages.113 Deep learning, which is a subset of and the state of the art of
machine learning, refers to extracting complex patterns from massive
volumes of data by emulating the human brain’s ability to observe,
analyze, learn, and make decisions.114
Whichever of these AI types is utilized, there are distinct situations
with AI and patent-disclosure interplay (or lack thereof) that present
transparency challenges. These situations are defined and utilized
throughout this Article and fall within one of four distinct scenarios: (1)
Disclosed AI-based tool; (2) Undisclosed AI-based tool; (3) Disclosed
AI-generated output; and (4) Undisclosed AI-generated output. These
scenarios are shown in Figures 1A & 1B, each of which is described in
greater depth below. Figure 1A shows a taxonomy of AI categories, and
Figure 1B provides social-policy-related considerations associated with
Figure 1A’s quadrants. The taxonomy of AI categories, as shown below
in Figures 1A and 1B, is helpful for ascertaining whether AI inventions
may cause concern for patent law and society. Each scenario turns on the
type of AI and the inherent level of disclosure by that type of AI. The
type of AI shown in Figure 1A is repeated in Figure 1B, which overlays

“cybernetic AI,” and suggesting that the involvement of humans with AI technology
presents a hybrid human-machine interaction).
110. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 89
(2014).
111. See id. at 88–89 (defining “machine learning techniques” as algorithms that
have the ability to improve in performance over time on some task, by detecting patterns
in data in order to automate complex tasks and make predictions).
112. See INFO. COMM’RS OFF., BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE
LEARNING AND DATA PROTECTION, Sept. 4, 2017, at 7–8, https://bit.ly/2XJ02QJ (defining
“machine learning” generally as being “the set of techniques and tools that allow
computers to ‘think’ by creating mathematical algorithms based on accumulated data”;
specifying that “supervised learning” involves algorithms based on labelled datasets, such
that the algorithms are trained how to map form input to output with the provision of
correct values assigned to them, and where the initial training phase creates models of the
world on which predictions can be made in a subsequent prediction phrase; and
specifying that “unsupervised learning” involves algorithms that are not trained, but are
left to find regularities in input data “without instructions as to what to look for”) (first
citing Deb Landau, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning: How Computers Learn,
INTEL (Aug. 17, 2016); and then citing ETHEM ALPAYDIN, INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE
LEARNING (3d ed. 2014)).
113. Josef Drexl et al., Technical Aspects of Artificial Intelligence: An
Understanding from an Intellectual Property Law Perspective, in MAX PLANCK
INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 4 (Max Planck
Inst. for Innovation & Competition, Research Paper No. 19-13, 2019).
114. See Najafabadi et al., supra note 87, at 1–2, 4.
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the concern and policy consideration associated with the particular type
of AI.

Figure 1A: Taxonomy of AI categories

Figure 1B: Social-policy-related considerations based on a taxonomy of
AI categories
An evaluation of the interplay (or lack thereof) of distinct AI
categories and patent disclosure must begin with the particular
characteristics of the categories. The fundamental characteristics of AIbased tools and AI-generated output, as shown in Figure 1A, provide
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some guidance for the social-policy-related considerations shown in
Figure 1B. The use cases described below provide new contexts and
more motivation for the debate between proponents and a skeptic of
patent disclosure. Unlike prior software technologies and statistical
analysis techniques, AI presents new considerations through: (1) the state
of the art of AI-based tools based on deep learning115 that emulates
human cognitive abilities; and (2) an exponential increase in data (in the
form of text, recordings, images, etc.) and computing power that enable
AI-based tools to be applied in domains116 where it may be difficult to
identify whether AI-based tools were used. Thus, AI presents a
metaphysical shift in software technology. Recognizing explainability of
an AI tool’s operation and inscrutability of AI-generated output is vital
for justifying the patent system117 and for normative accounts of how the
patent system should evolve.118
Although an AI-based tool and AI-generated output are shown in
the Figures as being distinct, it should be noted that some AI-based tools
can be applied to produce AI-generated output. An AI-based tool refers
to an AI-engine or AI-algorithm that is embedded into a module. AIgenerated output refers to the result of applying an AI-based tool and is
the outcome from analysis of data with several stages.119 Consequently,
the AI-based tool provides mathematical infrastructure, which, when
applied to training data and new data, analyzes patterns in the data to
produce a result that may be a prediction or representation of the physical
world. These descriptions of characteristics of AI are clarified by a
description of the social-policy-related terms associated with AI, such as
explainability and inscrutability.
Before delving into the details of the taxonomy, an overview is
warranted: In the first scenario, Quadrant (1) provides an undisclosed AIbased tool, which refers to the claiming of an AI-based tool along with
disclosure of the AI itself and how the AI operates. In the second
scenario, Quadrant (2) provides an AI-based tool without disclosure of
how the AI operates. In the third scenario, Quadrant (3) provides an
application of an AI-based tool to generate output that is claimed in a
patent application, where there is disclosure of the AI-generated output.
In the fourth scenario, Quadrant (4) provides an application of an AI115. See Sengupta et al., supra note 87, at 1, 2 (suggesting that multilayer artificial
neural networks comprise deep learning, which represents the complexity of the
aggregation chain across many hidden layers to learn sufficiently detailed
representations).
116. Eldred, supra note 83, at 2–3 (citing Eric Martin, Moore’s Law Is Alive and
Well, MEDIUM PREDICT (Dec. 21, 2018), https://bit.ly/3hp13X5).
117. See infra Part II.
118. See infra Part III.
119. See Drexl et al., supra note 113, at 4.
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based tool to generate output that is claimed in a patent application, but
there is no disclosure of the application of AI.
As shown earlier in Figures 1A and 1B, there are distinct scenarios
with AI and patent-disclosure interplay (or lack thereof) that present
transparency challenges. Two of the scenarios—(1) Disclosed AI-based
tool; and (3) Disclosed AI-generated output—are only briefly addressed
since they do not present social-policy-related considerations within the
scope of this Article. However, the two other scenarios—(2) Undisclosed AI-based tool and (4) Un-disclosed AI-generated output—are
more critically analyzed, since recognition of explainability of an AItool’s operation and inscrutability of AI-generated output are vital for
disclosure-related tensions. Descriptions and use-case examples provided
as context for disclosure-related tensions are shown in Figures 2A and
2B and explained further in Part II.120
In the first scenario, “Disclosed AI-based tool” refers to the
claiming of an AI-based tool along with disclosure of the AI itself and
how the AI operates. In other words, the inventor claims the AI, which
refers to the AI engine or the AI techniques inside of the AI-based tool,
and discloses how the AI-based tool can be applied to make AIgenerated output. A patent on an AI-based tool can have a preemptive
effect in the market regarding the use of data on application of the AIbased tool.121 Additionally, there are both patenting of AI-based tools122
and open-source modules of AI-based tools,123 but an analysis of patents
and open-source124 considerations on AI-based tools is outside of the
scope of this Article.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See infra Part II.
See Simon & Sichelman, supra note 50, at 382.
See Haney, supra note 88.
See generally ANTONIO GULLI & SUJIT PAL, DEEP LEARNING WITH KERAS:
IMPLEMENTING DEEP LEARNING MODELS AND NEURAL NETWORKS WITH THE POWER OF
PYTHON (2017) (explaining use of Keras for deep learning applications); ELI STEVENS ET
AL., DEEP LEARNING WITH PYTORCH (2020) (explaining use of PyTorch for deep learning
applications); GIANCARLO ZACCONE & MD. REZAUL KARIM, DEEP LEARNING WITH
TENSORFLOW: EXPLORE NEURAL NETWORKS AND BUILD INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS WITH
PYTHON (2d ed. 2018) (explaining use of Python for deep learning applications); KERAS,
https://bit.ly/2Am6Qf8 (last visited July 12, 2020) (showing an open-source library
designed to enable fast experimentation with AI, specifically deep neural networks);
PYTORCH, https://bit.ly/2ySf9Pu (last visited July 13, 2020) (offering an open-source AI
library used for applications such as computer vision); TENSORFLOW,
https://bit.ly/2XEuCLa (last visited July 14, 2020) (providing a free and open-source
software library for dataflow and differentiable programming for use in a range of AI
applications).
124. See Greg R. Vetter, Claiming Copyleft in Open Source Software: What if the
Free Software Foundation’s General Public License (GPL) Had Been Patented?, 2008
MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 281 (2008) (noting that important strands in the open-source
movement include available public source code disclosure); Greg R. Vetter, The
Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563, 594–96

176

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 125:1

In the second scenario, “Un-disclosed AI-based tool” refers to the
claiming of an AI-based tool without disclosure of how the AI operates.
In other words, the inventor claims the AI, which refers to the AI engine
or the AI techniques inside of the AI-based tool, but does not disclose
how an invention is made by the AI-based tool. Thus, the inventor does
not explain how or why an AI-based tool would generate certain AIgenerated output. Assuming that the inventor can overcome a patent
eligibility rejection for abstractness, the inventor can attain a patent grant
on the AI-based tool by meeting patentability. However, even with a lack
of an explanation of how and why the AI-based tool produces AIgenerated output, there could still be patent protection of an after-arising
technology125 under the doctrine of equivalents.126 In effect, an AI-based
tool can be a generator for various types of AI-generated output since
different data fed into its AI algorithms would produce different output.
Accordingly, the lack of explainability of the AI-based tool suggests that
patent protection of AI-based tools would extend to unforeseeable uses.
For example, in the area of computational chemistry, the inventor can
claim an AI-based tool (in the form of an engine, mechanism, or
technique) without explaining how it can predict the optimal function,
structure, and properties of a compound for a particular application.127
Thus, the mere fact that an inventor has claimed an AI-based tool may be
an issue for explainability, which is a major point of analysis of this
Article. This scenario is related to the fourth scenario (“Un-disclosed AIgenerated output”) since the inner workings of an AI-algorithm may not
comprehensibly relate the AI-based tool to the AI-generated output.

(2004) (explaining the open-source approach as having a kinship and freedom, and
finding software has more value with source code); Greg R. Vetter, Commercial Free
and Open Source Software: Knowledge Production, Hybrid Appropriability, and Patents,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087, 2091 (2009) (explaining the start and development of opensource projects); Greg R. Vetter, Exit and Voice in Free and Open Source Software
Licensing: Moderating the Rein over Software Users, 85 OR. L. REV. 183, 183 (2006);
Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or Promoting
Resistance?, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 53, 57 (2004); Greg R. Vetter, Open Source Licensing and
Scattering Opportunism in Software Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 225, 225 (2007); Greg R.
Vetter, Opportunistic Free and Open Source Software Development Pathways, 30 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 167, 167–68 (2017).
125. See Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring
Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 151 (2005) (“An ‘after-arising’
technology is a technology that ‘come[s] into existence after the filing date of a[] [patent]
application.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Application of Hogan, 559 F.2d 595,
605 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
126. See Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent
Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1948
(2005) (explaining that the Doctrine of Equivalents “allows a court to expand patent
scope beyond the rights literally claimed in the patent”).
127. See Ebrahim, supra note 19, at 595–96.
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In the third scenario, “Disclosed AI-generated output” refers to the
application of an AI-based tool to generate output that is claimed in a
patent application, where there is disclosure of the AI-generated output.
By comparison, the first scenario discloses how the AI-based tool can be
applied to make AI-generated output, whereas this third scenario
discloses how the AI-generated output is made by an AI-based tool
(without necessarily claiming the AI-based tool). An AI-based tool that
utilizes the same AI-technique may fail to replicate the AI-generated
output since the inventor may not know how or why the AI-based tool
produced the AI-generated output. Thus, the mere fact that an inventor
has claimed AI-generated output may be an issue for reproducibility,
which is a technological concern outside the scope of this Article.
In the fourth scenario, “Un-disclosed AI-generated output” refers to
the application of an AI-based tool to generate output that is claimed in a
patent application, but where there is no disclosure of the application of
AI. In other words, the generated output appears to be a product of
human invention but, in fact, it was created through the use of an AIbased tool. A patent examiner would be unable to distinguish whether the
invention was based on an AI-based tool or based on human ingenuity.
For example, an AI-based tool could be utilized in computational
chemistry for predicting the optimal function, structure, and properties of
a compound for a particular application.128 But the inventors do not
disclose that they used an AI-based tool for AI-generated output. In such
a scenario, the disclosure in the patent application would reveal how to
make or use the compound, but it would not disclose that an AI-based
tool has been utilized for providing AI-generated output in the form of
the compound’s composition of matter and method of manufacturing.129
This scenario presents a problem with inscrutability. In many such
situations, the patent system is presented with a new challenge, since the
disclosure would not enable a human having ordinary skill in the art to
make or use the invention without undue experimentation, but would
require either AI or a person using AI to make or use the invention
without undue experimentation. In this scenario, even if a human having
ordinary skill in the art could make or use the invention, it may require
undue experimentation. Thus, the mere fact that an inventor has claimed
AI-generated output may be an issue for inscrutability, which is a major
point of analysis of this Article.

128. See id.
129. In patent law practice in the unpredictable arts (such as chemistry-based
technologies), enablement and written description rejections are routine, particularly
since patent examiners often want to know from the inventor specifics of how chemical
compounds are made or used in greater detail.
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Explainability of an AI-based tool’s operation refers to the blackbox nature of AI, which is unexplainable.130 For example, an artificial
neural network is provided where the complex relationship between the
inputs and outputs, the ability to find patterns in data, and the capture of
the statistical structure in a set of data representing observed variables
are unexplainable131 since the network is self-learning.132 AI
130. See Finck, supra note 5, at 11, 15, 17.
131. In simple terms, being unexplainable means being indiscernible to the relevant
audience. The reason is that, as AI-based tools become non-linear, a human cannot
explain how one particular variable relates to another variable. In contrast, with simple
linear equations, humans may be able to explain how variables relate to one another. In
the context of complex AI-based tools, such as those utilizing deep learning, a human
would not be able to explain what inspired the underlying algorithm to develop the
weights associated with the deep learning layers. As a result, a human cannot aggregate
and diagnose the details between the deep learning layers, which contributes to a lack of
explainability.
132. See Michael D. Stein, Patenting Inventions in Machine Learning: Part 2,
LAW360 (Dec. 22, 2016), https://bit.ly/3do7h7s (providing as an example a patent claim
to a computer-implemented classification system comprising an artificial neural network
(ANN), which serves as an AI-based tool where the underlying algorithm and its
operation is unexplainable). Consider, as an example, U.S. Patent No. 6,792,412 (filed
Feb. 2, 1999) owned by plaintiff Hyper Search, LLC, and asserted against defendant
Facebook in Hyper Search, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., where the first patent claim states:
1. A system for controlling information output based on user feedback about
the information comprising:
A plurality of information sources providing information;
At least one neural network module that selects one or more of a
plurality of objects to receive information from the plurality of
information sources based at least in part on a plurality of inputs
and a plurality of weight values;
At least one server, associated with the neural network module,
that provides one or more of the objects to one or more
recipients;
The recipients enabling for one or more users to generate
feedback about the information; and
Wherein the neural network module generates a rating value for
a plurality of the objects at the end of an epoch, redetermines the
weight values using the rating values, and selects which objects
to receive information during a subsequent epoch using the
redetermined weight values and the inputs for the subsequent
epoch.
Hyper Search, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 17-1387-CFC-SRF, 2018 WL 6617143, at *10
(D. Del. Dec. 17, 2018) (emphasis added) (quoting ‘412 Patent, col. 19 l. 49–67).
Here, the lack of explainability refers to the neural network module (an AI-based
tool) identified above, which utilizes an AI-method (a neural network) and which the
district court found did not show how the system was an improvement in computer
capability. See id. As the court’s reasoning suggests, the neural network’s operation
would be indiscernible to the relevant audience (even after reading the detailed
description of the patent), since the neural network periodically re-evaluated the weights
based on ratings from the objects but provided no detail on how the model’s input or
output was processed. See id. Here, inscrutability refers to the inability to understand how
(or by which method) information output (AI-generated output), as identified above, was
produced or how the model operated or was trained. See id.
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explainability refers to the difficulty of making plain or comprehensible
the inner workings of an algorithm to humans.133 Thus, explainability of
AI-based tools can be achieved only when one opens the black box and
analyzes the underlying computational logic.134 However, even data
scientists, developers, and software engineers find it difficult to interpret
such AI-based tools, and there is much ongoing research into explaining
the underlying technological methods.135
Inscrutability refers to defying practical inspection and resisting
comprehension due to the underlying complex and numerous
calculations in the AI context.136 Thus, AI-generated output is
inscrutable, since one cannot understand how, or from which method the
output was produced.137 The application of AI-based tools applies

133. See Valérie Beaudouin et al., Flexible and Context-Specific AI Explainability:
A Multidisciplinary Approach 7–9, 12–13 (Mar. 23, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://bit.ly/3eGgFDD (suggesting that explainability refers to providing an explanation
of the functioning of an algorithm in its entirety or leaving uncertainty out by relegating a
particular algorithmic decision to a human user, and in so doing, suggesting that
explainability is a part of transparency, which in turns provides traceability, auditability,
and accountability to the system).
134. See Finck, supra note 5, at 15.
135. See Mühlhoff, supra note 109, at 2–3 (stating that deep learning “is a form of
distributed orchestration of human cognition through networked media technology” such
that “human cognitive skills . . . [are] embedded in machine networks,” and “harvesting
human cognition in computing networks through new forms of labor and machinized
power relations”).
136. See Selbst & Barocas, supra note 8, at 1094.
137. See Guided Image Composition on Mobile Devices, U.S. Patent No.
10,516,830 B2 (issued Dec. 24, 2019). Consider as an example the Guided Image
Composition on Mobile Devices patent, which is assigned to Adobe and which relates to
a system that automatically crops a picture with a good composition, for which patent
claim 14 states:
A system comprising:
a camera;
a display;
a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing computer-executable
instructions of an image processing application; and
a processing device communicatively coupled to the non-transitory
computer-readable medium for executing the computer-executable
instructions, wherein executing the computer-executable instructions
configures the system to perform operations comprising:
receiving image data corresponding to a field of view of the
camera, wherein the image data is received in a preview
mode of the image processing application;
rendering, in the preview mode, a major view of the display, the
major view presenting a previewed image based on the
image data;
receiving, from a deep-learning system, a composition score of a
cropped image generated by cropping the previewed image;
rendering, in the preview mode, a sub-view on the display, the
sub-view presenting the cropped image; and
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complex computations from feature inputs to outcome predictions that
are incomprehensible to humans138—the result is AI-generated
inventions. AI-based tools can be applied toward developing AIgenerated output, which can allow for: (1) claiming variations beyond
what the inventor actually invented to broaden claim scope; (2)
disclosing (without claiming) variations on existing patent claims and
preventing future improvements to destroy novelty; (3) claiming next
incremental steps and adding claims on demand in response to innovative
developments in certain fields; (4) claiming, by utilizing analytical
techniques and correlations to assist inventors in predicting performance
and properties of inventions in the physical world; and (5) claiming
prophecies with high accuracy through computational experimentation to
allow for an early patent grant.
In summary, the second scenario, “Un-disclosed AI-based tool,”
and the fourth scenario, “Un-disclosed AI-generated output,” are the
central concerns of this Article. These particular scenarios are the context
for the disclosure-related tensions shown in Figure 2B and explained

rendering, in the preview mode, the cropped image in the major
view based on a user interaction with the sub-view, wherein
the user interaction is (i) a swipe left or right to update the
previewed image with a cropped image displayed in a subview, (ii) a swipe up or down to perform a zoom operation,
or (iii) a tap to display a composition score.
Id. (emphasis added).
Here, inscrutability refers to AI-generated output in the form of a cropped image,
which is the data that is produced by the use of an AI-based tool in the form of a deeplearning system. See id. The cropped image would not be understandable if details of how
it was produced from the deep-learning system was not provided in the detailed
description of the patent application (which although is not shown here, specifies, “A
computer-implemented method for real-time image cropping”). Id. To be more precise,
the composition score could be the number of pixels of a particular color region, and
different AI-based tools can give different composition scores, which would result in
different cropped images; as a result, the removal of the phrase “by a deep-learning
system” (assuming it would still be awarded a patent), would result in an unidentified
invention of AI-generated output in the form of a cropped image. Id.
While this analysis recognized that this particular patent provided the deep learning
system and a first claim specifying the method to provide the cropped image, many AIinvention patents where an AI-based tool is applied to produce AI-generated output do
not specify how the AI-generated output was made (while meeting the enablement and
written description requirements). See id. Thus, had claim 1 not been included by the
inventor and had claim 14 been allowed by the USPTO, claim 14’s cropped image would
be an unidentified invention since it would constitute inscrutable AI-generated output that
was not understandable as to how (or which method) it was produced from. See id. While
this reasoning recognizes claim 1 is provided to explain the method of providing the
cropped image, here an example of inscrutability of claim 14 is shown for demonstration
purposes. See id. Moreover, a closer inspection of this patent reveals insufficient
explanation of the inner workings of the deep learning system, further demonstrating that
the AI-generated output of in the form of the cropped image is not understandable. See id.
138. See Selbst & Barocas, supra note 8, at 1094.
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further in Part II.139 The second scenario, “Un-disclosed AI-based tool,”
concerns identified AI inventions, for which this Article questions the
adequacy of patent disclosure of the inner workings of AI-based tools
and the inventive method of AI-generated output. The fourth scenario,
“Un-disclosed AI-generated output,” concerns unidentified inventions,
for which this Article cautions against a non-detection problem, an
overall lack of disclosure of unidentified inventions. Even if AIgenerated output is descriptively just like human-generated output in
appearance, there may be normative justifications against recognizing it
for patentability.
Indeed, since it is foreseeable that AI-generated output may be
examined to meet patentability by the USPTO, scholars and society may
expect that AI-generated output is worthy of patent protection. One
policy lever, which this Article assesses, is strengthening patent
disclosure. Prior to revisiting the explainability and inscrutability
concepts that this Article discussed in the Introduction140 and Part I, Part
II introduces theories and normative assessments141 that provide a
foundation for revisiting explainability and inscrutability in a prescriptive
sense in Part III.142 Therefore, it is necessary to consider the normative
accounts of promulgating disclosure with patents and preventing
protection through trade secrets to determine where the justification for
stronger patent disclosure stands concerning AI-based tools and AIgenerated output.
II.

THEORIES & NORMATIVE ASSESSMENTS OF
PATENT DISCLOSURE WITH AI

Part I concluded that patent protection may conceivably inhere in
AI-generated output. However, this conclusion still begs the question of
whether patent protection should conceivably inhere in AI-generated
output or, alternatively, if trade secrecy should come into play. Why
should society care whether there is patent protection of AI-generated
output? Is this question not as silly as being concerned about patent
protection of output generated through the use of any other tool or
software?
One crucial difference mentioned in Part I143 is that contemporary
AI increasingly blurs the lines between real and unreal.144 One might be
139. See infra Part II.
140. See supra INTRODUCTION.
141. See infra Part II.
142. See infra Part III.
143. See supra Part I.
144. See Ryan Abbott & Alex Sarch, Punishing Artificial Intelligence: Legal
Fiction or Science Fiction, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 323, 331 (2019).
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surprised to learn that AI-based tools are increasingly applied to produce
AI-generated output145 and that the USPTO has recognized unidentified
inventions as being increasingly prevalent for patent examination
consideration.146 As a result, the emergence of AI presents strains on
conceptual foundations, gaps, and unnecessary overlap between patent
and trade secret protection. At first glance, patents and trade secrets
appear mutually exclusive; however, they can be utilized in
complementary ways.147 Inventors may choose not to pursue patents on
AI due to AI’s lack of detectability and the inventors’ inability to discern
whether a competitor is using a disclosed AI technique. While there are
several challenges to attaining patent protection of AI inventions that
may prompt seeking trade secrecy protection,148 this Article considers an
enhanced AI patent disclosure as a policy lever to equilibrate this legal
protection decision.
A. Theories of the Patent and Trade Secret
Trade-off Decision with AI
The traditional view of the dichotomy between patents and trade
secrets emphasizes that patents are premised on disclosure, and trade
secrets are premised on a lack of disclosure.149 Whereas patent law (as
well as copyright law)150 is meant to promulgate disclosure, trade secret
law has the opposite function of preventing disclosure by maintaining
secrecy. Although patents and trade secrets may seem to be mutually
exclusive, they can be used in complementary ways.151 Patents and trade
secrets are not necessarily economic substitutes, and various forms of AI
may not be protected in a complementary fashion, which could yield
145. See supra Part I.
146. See supra Section I.B.
147. See ASHISH ARORA, ANDREA FOSFURI & ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, MARKETS
FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 262
(2001); Jessica M. Meyers, Artificial Intelligence and Trade Secrets, 11 LANDSLIDE, No.
3, 2019, https://bit.ly/2ZMB2ea; Michael Risch, Trade Secret Law and Information
Development Incentives, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 152 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds.,
2010).
148. See Asay, supra note 1, at 1200–19 (2020) (suggesting difficulties of AI
patenting with patentable subject matter, disclosure requirements, and novelty and nonobviousness).
149. See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade
Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (justifying trade secrets as a form of
intellectual property, and while providing the traditional viewpoint that trade secrets
suppress disclosure, asserting paradoxically that trade secret law encourages disclosures
based on investments into secrets by certain industries); Meyers, supra note 147.
150. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64
EMORY L. J. 71 (2014) (suggesting that expressive works are valuable to society by using
that expression to communicate knowledge).
151. See Meyers, supra note 147.
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socially harmful results.152 This Article argues, for AI inventions as a
particular type of invention, that societal benefits from greater disclosure
with patent law outweigh limiting disclosure with trade-secret law.
AI in the form of AI-based tools and AI-generated output can be
naturally hidden from human view. Against this backdrop, trade secrets
may seem like a natural choice of intellectual property protection. Yet
the interface between AI and patents is interesting on many levels and
presents normative implications for what should be protected with
patents rather than with trade secrets. The unique technological features
of AI, compared to other forms of software and statistical techniques in
general, present considerations for greater patent disclosure. Unlike other
software-based technologies, which, regardless of complexity, are
expensive to create but relatively easy to reproduce,153 AI technologies
present new social policy considerations.154 As this Article showed in
Part I, AI-based tools present challenges with explainability, and AIgenerated output presents challenges with inscrutability. As a result, one
policy consideration is greater patent disclosure of the inner workings of
AI-based tools and the inventive method of AI-generated output.
A restriction on patenting of AI-based tools would simultaneously
reduce incentives for research and development of AI algorithms,
deprive the public of knowledge and information of such tools, lessen
knowledge spillovers,155 and increase incentives to protect them with
trade secrecy.156 Scholars have noticed that weak patent disclosure has
152. See Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW.
U. L. REV. 377, 377, 430 (2017).
153. See Steven J. Frank, What AI Practitioners Should Know About the Law Part
1, AI MAG., Spring 1988, at 63.
154. See Philippe Lorenz & Kate Saslow, Demystifying AI & AI Companies,
STIFTUNG NEUE VERANTWORTUNG, July 2019, at 1, 2, 32 (noting that “AI [is] a hot topic
for social and economic policy,” including foreign policy, and furthermore that “[p]olicy
makers around the world have begun to understand the importance of AI [which] is
reflected in numerous international initiatives and fora devoted to AI [g]overnnace”).
155. See Adam B. Jaffe et al., The Meaning of Patent Citations: Report on the
NBER/Case-Western Reserve Survey of Patentees, in PATENTS, CITATIONS, AND
INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 379, 379–80, 388 (2002);
Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan
and the United States, 31 RES. POL’Y 1349, 1349–50 (2002); Ouellette, supra note 39, at
548, 550.
156. While restricting patenting of AI-based tools, or weakening patents would
reduce incentives for innovation, there are beneficial effects with promoting equitable
access and promoting distributive values. See Peter Lee, Towards a Distributive Agenda
for U.S. Patent Law, HOU. L. REV. 55, 321, 323–24 (2017) (suggesting that enforcing
exclusive rights with patents is consonant with access, equity, and distributive justice
issues, but stressing that patent law scholarship should consider the effect on incentives
on technological development on marginalized communities); see also Elif Kavusturan,
Reforming U.S. Patent Law to Enable Access to Essential Medicines in the Era of
Artificial Intelligence, NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. (forthcoming),
https://bit.ly/321UlBa (recognizing that while incentives for patents are important, there
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led innovators to avoid the competition-promoting function of patent
expiration and switch to trade secrecy.157 As a result of these effects, this
Article’s normative position is that there should be enhanced AI patent
disclosure. The ensuing discussion presents the theoretical trade-off of
patents and trade secrets; after which, there is a normative assessment of
enhanced AI patent disclosure. To understand the theory and normative
assessment, some preliminary discussion on the theory of self-disclosing
and non-self-disclosing inventions is necessary.
The terms “self-disclosing” and “disclosing” refer to the level of
ease or difficulty of reverse-engineering the invention158—a selfdisclosing invention is considered easy to reverse engineer; in contrast, a
non-self-disclosing invention is expensive to reverse engineer.159 Reverse
engineering refers to the process by which an object is deconstructed
through a backward-looking inspection to deduce its architecture, design,
or features or the methodology for its development or manufacturing.160
Software reverse engineering includes identifying the blueprints of
source code and object code as well as their interrelationships in a high
level of abstraction.161 AI inventions fall within a specialized
technological area where reverse engineering would be more challenging
than other forms of software. In general, software patents often cover the
functionality embedded in source code but do not reveal all of the
technical details that make reverse engineering easy. AI inventions are
even more difficult to reverse engineer because they are neither
explainable nor scrutable.162
The distinction between self-disclosing and non-self-disclosing
inventions is helpful in understanding societal trade-offs between patents
and trade secret protection. Under the theory of “self-disclosing” and
“disclosing” inventions, self-disclosing inventions are easily copied from
the commercial embodiment, whereas non-self-disclosing inventions are

are tradeoffs with access, such as, for health care and pharmaceuticals, including effects
concerning pricing, health risks, and essential medicines); W. Keith Robinson, Access to
the Patent System, NEV. L.J. (forthcoming), https://bit.ly/3fhfon8 (noting that patenting of
artificial intelligence affects underrepresented innovators, including small businesses,
women, and underrepresented minorities, as well as socially immobile communities).
157. See Anton et al., supra note 63, at 1 (noting that weak patents cause firms to
rely more heavily on secrecy and potentially reduce the incentives to innovate).
158. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 14, 17 (2001) (noting that “intellectual property
regimes that have traditionally protected software permit reverse engineering”).
159. See Ouellette, supra note 39, at 588.
160. See Tonya M. Evans, Reverse Engineering IP, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 61, 88 (2013).
161. See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse
Engineering, and Professor Miller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 975, 991–95 (1994).
162. See supra Part I.
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not easily copied.163 Typically, patents are sought on inventions that are
self-disclosing, or relatively cheap to reverse engineer, whereas an
inventor will only patent a non-self-disclosing invention if it seems likely
that others will recreate the invention before the patent expires.164 In
other words, patenting of non-self-disclosing inventions would not occur
if the invention would reach the public inevitably.
The
self-disclosing/non-self-disclosing
distinction
requires
understanding more about whether sufficient information is contained in
a patent application and about the ease of reverse engineering the
invention to gauge whether the invention would be fruitful to the public.
The relevant question is whether society would want to enforce more
robust patent disclosure of non-self-disclosing inventions. In other
words, the normative inquiry is whether enhanced patent disclosure will
serve the public good by enhancing the potential for follow-on inventions
and steering others away from duplicative efforts to reinvent the patented
invention. Figures 2A and 2B reflect this tension; then, a normative
assessment of enhanced AI patent disclosure is provided. Figures 2A and
2B provide a graphical representation of the available legal protections of
the taxonomy of AI categories shown earlier,165 with the central analysis
of this Article depicted as a dotted line below.

Figure 2A: Relating Degree of Reverse Engineering with AI Taxonomy
and IP Protections

163. See Katherine J. Standburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and
the Patent Bargain, WIS. L. REV., 2004, at 81, 112.
164. See Oullette, supra note 39, at 546.
165. See supra Part I.
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Figure 2B: Patent and Trade Secret for Non-Self Disclosing and UnDisclosed AI
Patent disclosure is particularly relevant with AI-generated-output
inventions, which are non-self-disclosing (that is, expensive to reverse
engineer)166—this is counter to the theory of self-disclosing/non-selfdisclosing inventions,167 which provides that inventors seek patents for
non-self-disclosing inventions if it seems likely that others will recreate
the invention before the patent expires. By contrast, and as central AIspecific themes in this Article: (1) AI inventors seek patents for AIgenerated output inventions, although it seems likely that others will not
recreate the invention before the patent expires;168 and (2) AI is not only
included in identified inventions, but could also be in unidentified
inventions.169 The first theme relates to inventors’ rush to seek patents on
AI-generated output for defensive patenting.170 The second theme relates
to patents on AI-generated output where a patent examiner does not
understand whether an AI-based tool was put into operation. These
themes are interrelated and stem from the challenge of AItransparency—including explainability and inscrutability—in patent
disclosure and AI inventors’ strategic decision between patent protection
and trade secret protection, which this Part has asserted are not
necessarily substitutes. Subsequently, this Article provides theories held
by a skeptic of and proponents of the disclosure function of patents and

166. See Ouellette, supra note 39, at 546.
167. See Standburg, supra note 163, at 104–06; Ouellette, supra note 39, at 546.
168. See infra Section II.B.1 (suggesting that this phenomenon could be due to risk
aversion, a response to weak patentability criterion for AI inventions, or an early gold
rush for AI patenting, or some combination thereof).
169. See infra Section II.B.2.
170. The mere fact that there is a lot of AI patenting from observation might
indicate an arms race in which firms are patenting defensively. Perhaps all firms would
be better off if they could agree to a patenting moratorium. In relation to this point, it
would be helpful to understand whether AI patents might facilitate licensing-based
business models that are inherently difficult to execute based on a trade secrecy business
model.
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an assessment of why there is a need for enhanced AI patent disclosure,
the normative position of this Article.
B. Theories of Patent Disclosure
Section 112 of the Patent Act requires inventors to explain their
invention—known as claim definiteness—as well as how to make or use
the invention—the disclosure requirements of enablement and written
description.171 Disclosure is an important feature of patents since it sets
the boundaries of patents and represents what the inventor actually
invented.172 Before addressing the need for enhanced AI patent disclosure
and mechanisms for enhancing patent disclosure with AI, some
preliminary introduction about the theories of patent disclosure is
warranted.
1. Theories by a Skeptic of Patent Disclosure
Inventors must satisfy the legal standard of disclosure as required
under 35 U.S.C. § 112.173 Patent disclosure is carried out by satisfying
two separate requirements—written description and enablement—and
serves to adequately disclose the invention to the public.174 The
enablement requirement refers to providing an explanation of the
invention to enable others to recreate it,175 and the written description
requirement describes the invention in a way that one skilled in the art
could clearly conclude that the invention was that of the inventor.176
Furthermore, the patent claims, which demarcate the boundaries of the
invention, are part of the disclosure. The disclosure in a patent
application must allow a person having ordinary skill in the art
(“PHOSITA”)
to
practice
the
invention
without
undue
171. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018).
172. See John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate
Patent Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 611 (2016).
173. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018).
174. See Guang Ming Whitley, Comment, A Patent Doctrine Without Bounds: The
“Extended” Written Description Requirement, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 617–18 (2004)
(suggesting that written description has traditionally served as a policing doctrine to
prevent patent applicants from improperly amending patent claims after submitting a
patent application, whereas the enablement requirement ensures that public knowledge is
enriched by the patent specification commensurate with the scope of the patent claims).
175. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); ROBERT P. MERGES &
JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 247–323 (7th ed. 2017)
(discussing disclosure and enablement); Sean B. Seymore, Uninformative Patents, 55
HOUS. L. REV. 377, 384–85 (2017); Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum Swings Back,
supra note 24, at 279; Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, supra
note 24, at 127.
176. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1997)); Holbrook, supra note 25, at 127.
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experimentation.177 In effect, patent law’s disclosure function is a way
for the inventor to reveal the invention to society. The legal and policy
debates about patent disclosure are those of costs versus benefits for
society. The underlying issues are whether stronger patent disclosure
should be a central goal for quid pro quo of the patent system rather than
keeping an invention secret.
One commentator has criticized disclosure theory as a justification
for the patent system for several reasons, including: (1) patents do not
disclose much useful information to technologists and contain inadequate
specifications; (2) disclosure is inconsistent with the patent system’s
normative foundations; and (3) strengthening disclosure is unnecessary
since patents are distinct from the underlying technology.178 As to this
first reason, this commentator is not alone. Numerous other skeptics
point out that the inadequacies and inefficiencies of patent disclosure are
particularly problematic in information technology and software, for
which patents do not convey meaningful information, and their sheer
volume makes distinguishing from prior art exhausting.179 In this realm,
one commentator points out that the patent system encourages disclosure
of useful information in only a narrow class of inventions.180 Second, this
skeptic of patent disclosure argues that the benefits of disclosure are
secondary
to
economic
incentives
for
invention
and
commercialization,181 and that these goals often come into conflict.182
This viewpoint suggests that the patent system is a means to induce
innovation and remedy a public-goods problem, and that disclosure is a
disincentive and cost that comes hand-in-hand with the patent grant.183
Third, this skeptic distinguishes the disclosure function from incentives
177. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737; Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum
Swings Back, supra note 24, at 279.
178. See Devlin, supra note 42, at 404.
179. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?,
58 EMORY L.J. 181, 202 (2008); Arti K. Rai, John R. Allison & Bhaven N. Sampat,
University Software Ownership and Litigation: A First Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1519, 1531 (2009); Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First
Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1135–
36 (2009).
180. See Benjamin N. Roin, Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System
(Or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2016 (2005).
181. See Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation
and the Innovation Process 41 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7280, 1999) (summarizing arguments for why software patents are undesirable from a
commercial and market perspective, including: the untenable need to secure many
different licenses in order to market any given software-based product, the result of
driving smaller software firms out of business since the need for multiple licenses favors
large firms that can bargain for cross-licensing, and the requirement that software
interfaces with other pieces of software necessitating interoperability).
182. See Devlin, supra note 42, at 404, 406.
183. See id. at 412, 416, 418, 419.
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and points out that the invention itself is self-revealing, even if the patent
document does not provide sufficient clarity.184 In sum, skepticism of the
normative goals of patent disclosure suggests that greater disclosure is
ineffective and detrimental to the patent system’s social goals.
2. Theories by Proponents of Patent Disclosure
To be fair, the patent-disclosure skeptic’s views are not entirely
without merit in a limited circumstance, in the sense that patent
disclosure may not be good enough in practice. However, the majority of
the scholarly patent community agrees that patents should provide
disclosure and that patent disclosure has significant societal benefits.
Proponents of patent disclosure provide insights into and distinctions of
AI that are worth exploring in-depth. Proponents point out that patent
disclosure provides one source of useful technical information to
researchers,185 demarcates the contours of property rights,186 achieves the
goal of predictable patent claim boundaries,187 and prevents overclaiming.188 Contrary to critics of disclosure’s benefits, many scholars
have provided empirical evidence that patent disclosure has benefits for
the use of technical information and provides knowledge spillovers.189
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that patent disclosure advances the
storehouse of knowledge that leads to further advancements and
improvements in the technology area.190
In addition to the legal and technological benefits of patent
disclosure, scholars have noted that there are also strategic business
benefits of patent disclosure that yield a competitive advantage. One
scholar has shown that a firm leading a patent race has an incentive to
disclose in order to reduce its rival’s expected payoff and encourage the
rival to quit the race.191 This perspective suggests that patent races
prompt greater disclosure of new information to the public to preempt
the issuance of a patent to a firm that is ahead of its competitor in the
patent race. Other scholars have determined that a firm trailing in a
patent race has an incentive to disclose to extend a patent race since the
184. See id. at 405, 406, 411, 418, 427.
185. See Ouellette, supra note 39, at 533.
186. See Devlin, supra note 42, at 409.
187. See Miller, supra note 40, at 180.
188. See Rantanen, supra note 41, at 370.
189. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
190. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
191. See generally Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker & Kate Kraus, Strategic
Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175 (2000) (explaining the strategic
use of patent disclosure in the realm of patent races, and in so doing, analyzing the
incentive to disclose for preempting a rival’s patent when the laggard lacks the ability to
leapfrog the leader, and concluding that a leader in a patent race has an incentive to
disclose to cause the rival to quit the race).
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trailing firm needs more time to catch up in the race.192 This perspective,
for which the disclosing firm still plans to pursue patents, suggests that
patent disclosure serves as a strategy to enable continuation of the race.
Another view suggests that firms that are not planning to pursue patents
see patent disclosure as a defensive business strategy to thwart a rival
firm’s patents or keep the rival firm from obtaining patents.193
C. Normative Assessment with AI Disclosure
A relevant question concerning AI inventions and patent disclosure
is: are the benefits of stronger disclosure underappreciated? As patent
law and society begin to grapple with AI-generated inventions, there are
new interactions between the unique technological features of AI194 and
patent law. There is much about AI that is decidedly unfamiliar to
disclosure for patentability and detection of disclosure for patent
examination. For instance, by disclosure for patentability, an inventor
might not disclose that they used an AI-based tool to create AI-generated
output.195 Patent law generally encourages inventors to use tools in the
invention process and to invest in research and development of tools for
which they seek patent protection (or alternatively trade secrecy).196
Harder to explain, though, are some other aspects of AI in patent
examination. For instance, no capability exists at the USPTO to
determine whether an invention is based on AI-generated output from the
use of an AI-based tool. Even if patent examination could ascertain
whether an invention was AI-generated output, there is, strangely,
nothing in patent law that prohibits such a practice. Recently, the USPTO
and the EPO have indicated that AI cannot be an inventor,197 and the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) has held patent claims involving
AI to be patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. §101;198 additionally, and most
192. See Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent
Race, 48 J.L. & ECON. 173, 173–94 (2005) (describing that since patents are evaluated in
light of the prior art, patent disclosures make it more difficult for another firm to make a
related patent claim, and therefore, patent disclosure extends a patent race since the
subsequent invention must have a sufficient advance over an expanded prior art).
193. See Justin P. Johnson, Defensive Publishing by a Leading Firm, 28 INFO.
ECON. & POL’Y 15, 15 (2014).
194. See supra Section I.A.
195. See supra Section I.B.
196. See supra Section II.A.
197. See In re Application of Application No.: 16/524,350, 2020 Dec. Comm’r Pat.;
EPO Publishes Grounds for Its Decision to Refuse Two Patent Applications Naming a
Machine as Inventor, EUROPEAN PAT. OFF. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://bit.ly/3d5TGBu.
198. See ex parte Hannun, No. 2018-003323 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 11, 2019) (describing
that the claims involved a method for speech recognition using a trained neural network
and that the patent examiner asserted that the claims recited a mathematical
relationship/formula and certain methods of organizing human activity and a mental
process; noting that the PTAB found the claimed steps could not “practically be
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importantly for patent practitioners, there are no court decisions
addressing whether the issue involved AI-generated output and no
mechanism for detecting AI-generated inventions.199 In fact, AIgenerated inventions do not even have a visible distinction from humangenerated inventions—yet not one fully AI-generated invention has been
acknowledged by the USPTO. When asked about AI-generated
inventions, the USPTO acknowledged that AI is included in more than
one-third of all identified inventions.200 However, the USPTO has yet to
acknowledge what may be the alarming rise of “un-identified” (that is,
AI-generated) inventions.
In the world of AI inventions, one may ask whether the distinction
between AI-generated and human-generated inventions is truly
necessary. By studying AI, this Part argues that inventions should be
addressed by patent law, and that we can gain insight into how norms
and laws of inventing become even more “artificial.”
1. Disclosure for Patentability
AI-based tools, which were introduced earlier in this Article, result
in “artificial” inventions,201 but they are not “magic.”202 Using less lofty
language, one may call this “the use of a super-human tool to assist a
human inventor.” AI-based tools are just one type of tool in the larger
environment of tools that inventors utilize in the invention process. Other
tools include rulers and slide rules, calculators, microscopes, mass
spectrometers, chromatographs, debugging tools, compilers, computeraided design, and even advanced software-based tools, such as finiteelement analysis and computational fluid dynamics. Unlike other tools,
AI’s state-of-the-art machine learning,203 deep learning, and
performed mentally,” so as to determine that the claim was not a mental process and
found the claim to be patent eligible); Braden M. Katterheinrich et al., Artificial
Intelligence at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, FAEGRE DRINKER (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://bit.ly/30BX0B2 (explaining that ex parte Hannun and other PTAB decisions have
found that “AI-related inventions are more likely to be found patent-eligible at the
USPTO when the claims do not explicitly recite mathematical formulas and instead recite
AI-related features that are technologically-specific and that cannot practically be
replicated in one’s mind”).
199. See supra Section I.B.
200. See Iancu AI Policy Update, supra note 48.
201. See supra INTRODUCTION.
202. See supra Section I.A.
203. See, e.g., ALEX SMOLA & S. V. N. VISHWANATHAN, INTRODUCTION TO
MACHINE LEARNING 3–6 (2008) (describing a variety of machine learning applications,
where there exists a nontrivial dependence between some observations for which a simple
set of deterministic rules is not known, such as: (1) web page ranking, which is a process
of submitting a query to a search engine to find webpages relevant to the query and
returning them in an order of relevance; (2) collaborative filtering, where Internet
bookstores utilize users’ “past purchase and viewing decisions” information to predict
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reinforcement learning capabilities can be used to conceive of new
inventions and to create a new class of patent applications without much,
if any, human input.204 Such inventions would otherwise be too complex
for a human’s limited reasoning capabilities.
This “artificial world” of AI inventions encompasses AI-based tools
that can be applied toward producing AI-generated output. AI-based
tools allow a human inventor to simulate complexity and scale of
analysis beyond human capabilities, and in so doing, allow the human
inventor to creatively meet the patentability criteria. AI-based tools can
be taken a step further by inventors using them to provide AI-generated
output.205 AI-based tools challenge, among other things, patentability by
introducing a non-human206 element in the conception process of
invention.207 Obviously, this is a new concept for inventions, if it is even
properly characterized as an invention at all now. For instance, in the
invention process, AI-based tools allow for supplementing human
input,208 predicting outcomes before they may occur in the physical
future viewing and purchase habits of similar users; (3) speech recognition, where an
audio sequence is annotated with text or where handwriting is annotated with a sequence
of strokes; and (4) classification, where a spam filtering program can identify whether an
email contains relevant information or not, such as a frequent traveler email from an
airline, based on the type of user). See generally GIANLUCA BONTEMPI, HANDBOOK:
STATISTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MACHINE LEARNING (2017), https://bit.ly/3gvO2uA
(explaining how to extract knowledge from large amounts of data, including procedures
such as knowledge extraction, pattern analysis, and data processing, and how to model
such processes using computational techniques).
204. See also Saptarshi Sengupta et. al., A Review of Deep Learning with Special
Emphasis on Architectures, Applications and Recent Trends, KNOWLEDGE-BASED
SYSTEMS, Apr. 2020, at 1.; Zahangir Alom et. al., A State-of-the-Art Survey on Deep
Learning Theory and Architectures, ELECTRONICS, Mar. 2019, at 1; Hironobu Fujiyoshi
et. al., Deep Learning-Based Image Recognition for Autonomous Driving, 43 IATSS RES.
244, 244 (2019); Najafabadi et al., supra note 87, at 4. See generally CHARU C.
AGGARWAL, NEURAL NETWORKS AND DEEP LEARNING (2018) (explaining the theory and
algorithms of deep learning, with a focus on concepts concerning neural network
architectures).
205. See supra Section II.B.
206. See Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, Data-Centric Technologies: Patent & Copyright
Doctrinal Disruptions, 43 NOVA L. REV. 287, 317–20 (2019).
207. Robin C. Feldman & Nick Thieme, Competition at the Dawn of Artificial
Intelligence, J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6–8,
https://bit.ly/36zdPgQ) (explaining that conception requires “the formation in the mind of
the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as
it is thereafter to be applied in practice,” and that patent law requires some degree of
consciousness by its inventors).
208. See generally GIUSEPPE SANSEVERINO, THE ABILITY TO CHASE DOWN OUR
DREAMS: INVENTIVE STEP AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2018), https://bit.ly/2zv9Gyt
(suggesting some human involvement with AI in the current state of artificial narrow
intelligence technology, including for a preliminary phase, a subsequent stage of
processing the results, and examining the innovative results, and asserting that tensions in
patent law arise only when these phases are subject to human intervention); Mühlhoff,
supra note 109 (suggesting that today’s artificial intelligence technology is dependent on
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world,209 and doing hundreds to millions of human calculations and
decisions in a fraction of the time of an ordinary human.210
Perhaps because AI-based tools support this kind of rich and
“artificial” interaction with inventors in the invention process, many
scholars who have studied AI have identified doctrinal tensions with
patent law, including with inventorship,211 patent eligibility,212 nonobviousness,213 and enablement.214 For instance, with AI-based tools,
some scholars have suggested that computers should be considered
inventors rather than humans.215As an additional example, scholars have
argued that the PHOSITA standard should be modified to consider
“thinking machines” 216 since “everything is obvious”217 with the use of
AI-based tools. AI-based tools pressure the patent system since they
reduce the time for humans to conceive of an invention and
constructively reduce it to practice, simplify the complexity of the
inventive task, and produce an earlier patent grant. But one may reply—
so what? And how should patent law respond?218
2. Detection of Disclosure for Patent Examination
AI-generated output, which this Article introduced earlier, results in
“artificial” inventions.219 “Artificial” means the inventions are fictitious
and imaginary but appear as if they had been created in the physical
world. These inventions may be considered as being either imaginary,
never-achieved, or unworkable to the inventor, but may appear as if they
were created, tested, or made workable to reasonable onlookers of the
patent document. In other words, inventors can utilize an AI-based tool
to provide AI-generated output, from which they develop a patent
human participation, but that advanced and developing artificial intelligence technology
such as deep learning will provide a socio-technological transformation between humans
and machines that will entail new models of subjectivation with less human involvement
and digital labor).
209. See Ebrahim, supra note 19, at 596 (explaining the use of AI simulations to
describe hypothetical chemical structures and their properties in the specification of a
patent application, such as with prophetic patent claims and broad genus patent claims).
210. See Drexl et al., supra note 113, at 4 (explaining machine learning, including
its subcategories and related fields, training processes, black-box nature, outputs, and
evolutionary algorithms).
211. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 1079; Feldman & Thieme, supra note 207, at 9–
11; Ravid & Liu, supra note 11, at 2215; Schuster, supra note 11, at 1959.
212. See Mizuki Hashiguchi, The Global Artificial Intelligence Revolution
Challenges Patent Eligibility Law, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 5 (2017).
213. See Vertinsky, supra note 12; Ryan Abbott, supra note 12, at 2.
214. See Früh, supra note 5, at 6, 13.
215. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 1079.
216. Vertinsky, supra note 12.
217. Abbott, supra note 12, at 2.
218. See infra Part III.
219. See supra INTRODUCTION.
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application that includes legitimate-sounding diagrams and descriptions
of how an invention might work without ever having taken, checked, and
tested that it actually works in the physical world. One might reasonably
ask how an inventor that utilized an AI-based tool could obtain hundreds
to thousands to millions of patents protecting AI-generated output that
either was hardly (or never) developed or effectively was concealed
through an unexplainable algorithmic inventive process.
As a result of the unexplainable (that is, indiscernible to the relevant
audience) AI-based tool’s operation, such AI-generated output is
inscrutable (that is, not understandable as to how, or by which method it
was produced). In a legal sense, patent law scholars may deem such AIgenerated output as being prophetic220 or resulting in too early of a patent
grant.221 Yet AI-generated output claimed in a patent application appears
“real,” even though it is “unreal” in terms of actual reduction to
practice.222 If the patent system accepted AI-generated output as real,
then we may need to consider banishing from patent examination all
manner of inventions, including purely human-generated inventions,
machine-assisted human inventions, and—most importantly for society’s
purposes—AI-generated inventions, since it is impossible to distinguish
between them.
Of course, this assessment reveals that there are many senses of the
words “artificial” and “real.” Ontologically speaking, “artificial
inventions” in the form of AI-generated output claimed in a patent
application have much in common with virtual reality.223 Augmented
220. See Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 666–68
(2019) (referring to prophetic patent claims as being permissible, common, and
comprising “made-up experiments and fictional data in patents”) (first citing Atlas
Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
and then citing MPEP (9th ed. 2015) § 608.01(p)); Christopher M. Holman, Nuvo v. Dr.
Reddy and the Patentability of Prophetic Pharmaceutical Inventions Based on
Unexplained Inventive Insight, 38 BIOETCHNOLOGY L. REP. 207, 207 (2019). Holman
defines a “prophetic claim” as a:
[P]atent claim with respect to which, as of the filing date, no embodiment
falling within the scope of the claim has actually been reduced to practice,
either by it having been made (in the case of a product) or performed (in the
case of process), or if it has been made or performed it has been physically
demonstrated that the claimed product or process provides the practical utility
that the invention is purported to provide.
Id. See also Ebrahim, supra note 19 at 596–98, 606–09, 618, 621, 636, 640–41, 649.
221. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 68–69 (2009) (discussing how the early-filing nature of a patent
application well before a commercial application results in patents before the commercial
viability of the invention, consequently creating an ever-rising number of underdeveloped
patents).
222. See MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) § 2138.05.
223. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, The Real Law of Virtual Reality, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 51, 51 (2017) (describing virtual reality as being about virtual
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reality generates realistic images and other sensations that simulate
physical presence in a virtual environment.224 Virtual reality masterfully
blends the distinctions between unreal and real.225 Similarly, AIgenerated output seems physically real, but that physical reality is largely
a faux representation of what an invention might be if there were any
semblance of reduction to practice by the inventor.226 For instance,
biological and chemical compounds, drugs and pharmaceuticals, and
materials and nanotechnology—or what patent law scholars use as
examples of the “unpredictable arts”227—can appear in a patent
application as AI-generated output representations of what may appear in
the physical world, but in fact are prophecies.228 Conventional
composition-of-matter patent claims and product patent claims are not
limited by a reduction to practice229 that occurs in the physical world but
can be computationally experimented upon230 with the use of AI-based
tools to produce AI-generated output on the computer. Should patent law
embrace the unreal AI-generated output, and if so, how can the unreal be
detected in patent examination with a fictitious disclosure? Should
society expect patent examiners to reasonably detect such imaginary,
never-achieved, or unworkable disclosure, and if not, then what are the
patent administration possibilities?
Indeed, many inventors are embracing the unreality of AI-generated
output by the application of AI-based tools. Despite probable skepticism,

interactions and communications with someone in another part of the world, and
providing gaming as an application example).
224. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented
Reality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2018) (explaining that augmented reality “allows
digital content to be layered over the real world,” and that, “[u]sing special glasses or . . .
a smartphone, [augmented reality] users can see the real world as it actually exists, but
with digital images superimposed on the world so that they seem to exist as part of the
world”).
225. See W. Keith Robinson & Joshua T. Smith, Emerging Technologies
Challenging Current Legal Paradigms, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 355, 360–61 (2018).
226. See MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) § 2138.05; Mark A. Lemley, Ready for
Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1172, 1177 (2016).
227. See Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, supra note
24, at 137–39.
228. See Freilich, supra note 220, at 715 (explaining that prophecies in patent law
may be enough to get a patent granted but may not be enough to convince investors as
being valuable, and also that prophecies in patents may not represent something that is
functional or workable).
229. Reduction to practice has not historically required any physical embodiment,
just an adequate description of how to make and use. Thus, drawings and diagrams of a
machine, for example, are sufficient with an explanation, and an inventor need not have
built the physical embodiment.
230. See generally Ebrahim, supra note 19 (exploring the use of AI computational
technologies to experiment upon the structure, function, and properties of chemical
compounds on the computer).
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AI-generated output is inscrutable and significant in patent examination
for three primary reasons.
First, from the standpoint of anticipating future patenting
capabilities, contemporary AI-based tools, as the precursors to state-ofthe-art deep learning,231 will present challenges for patent examination in
the future. As AI usage becomes increasingly important in the future of
invention activity, there will be a related problem of detection of the use
of AI at the USPTO for patent examination.232 Contemporary AI-based
tools do not yet emulate the human brain, but AI usage in patent
prosecution can allow a patent practitioner to more easily overcome
rejections in office actions by analyzing past patterns of the
corresponding patent examiner and the particular art unit. In so doing,
the inventor can produce AI-generated output to assist in overcoming
patentability rejections provided in office actions. The concern from a
patent examination standpoint is whether a patent examiner will detect
that such AI capabilities are being utilized by the inventor.
Second, the use of AI-based tools to meet patentability is related to
the issue of AI-generated output being indistinguishable from humangenerated output in patent applications. This phenomenon of the use of
AI for meeting patentability also illustrates a second reason why AIgenerated output is worthy of consideration, namely the institutional
mechanisms for detecting, monitoring, and distinguishing between the
“real” patent claims and unreal patent claims based on AI-generated
output. The USPTO will need to assess the right amount and depth of
disclosure in patent applications, and algorithmic governance233 at the
USPTO will require proactive design and maintenance of systems
capable of detecting AI-generated output that are transparent, unbiased
among inventor types, and accountable as to why patentability decisions
are made by AI-aided patent examiners. It will be a challenge to craft AIbased tools that detect AI-generated output and that meaningfully fulfill
transparency to ensure fidelity to the USPTO’s public accountability
mandate. With an AI-aided patent examiner, an interrelated challenge is
the development of evaluation metrics of patentability, such as why an
inventor got a rejection or why there was a notice of allowance.
A third reason for exploring AI-generated output is that it represents
an amazing experiment in internal AI-capacity building for USPTO
231. See Zahangir Alom et al., A State-of-the-Art Survey on Deep Learning Theory
and Architectures, ELECTRONICS, Mar. 2019, at 1, 44, https://bit.ly/2Yrv7st.
232. See Ebrahim, supra note 53, at 1240–44 (suggesting that a counteracting
artificial intelligence institution will need to be created in order to aid in the detection of
the use of AI at the USPTO during patent examination in order to “serve as a guarantee
of patent applications derived from artificial intelligence”).
233. See Ryan Calo & Danielle Keats Citron, The Automated Administrative State:
A Crisis of Legitimacy, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2020).
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patent examination.234 The USPTO will need to invest in their technical
and data infrastructure,235 which will require addressing the interrelated
challenges of deploying AI-based tools that require building internal staff
capacity.236 The inevitable implications are that: (1) the USPTO will
need to grapple with budgeting and other human-resource constraints;237
and (2) the USPTO will need to develop standardization across its
technology centers and its art units.
D. Theories for Justification of Patent Disclosure of
AI-Generated Output
Given the previous descriptive account in Section I.B238 and the
problems with AI disclosure described in Part II,239 there is substance to
the claim that there might be patent claiming of AI-generated output,240
much of which may not be identified in patent examination. AIgenerated output is no less a reasonable concept of patent protection than
human-generated output. Many legal scholars have explored the
justifications for the existence of various economic incentives to the
patent system.241 Therefore, it is necessary to consider normative
accounts of AI-generated output to determine where the justification for
AI-generated output stands in relation to established forms of humangenerated output for patent law.
There are normative accounts of patents, and these accounts differ
in significant ways to yield different conclusions about whether a given
output is appropriately characterized as being worthy of patent
protection. Strangely, the two normative theories conclude—though with
qualifications—that AI-generated output, as claimed in patents, is, in

234. See Ebrahim, supra note 53, at 1241.
235. See generally Prithwiraj Choudhury et al., The Future of Patent Examination
at the USPTO, HARV. BUS. SCH. PUB., Apr. 2017 (suggesting that the USPTO will need to
invest in new tools as AI and machine learning uses have emerged and applied in the
context of patent applications that are filed with the USPTO).
236. See Rai, supra note 7, at 2636–38.
237. See generally Naira Rezende Simmons, Putting Yourself in the Shoes of a
Patent Examiner: Overview of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Patent Examiner Production (Count) System, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 32
(2017) (describing the USPTO’s Production Units and the “count” system, which
evaluate the performance of a patent examiner, and as a result of such metrics, the
USPTO has budget and human-resource constraints).
238. See supra Section I.B.
239. See supra Part II.
240. See Iancu AI Policy Update, supra note 48.
241. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 265, 285 (1977); Kesan, supra note 28, at 898 (examining several theories that
explain and justify the role of patents in the modern economy, including traditional ex
ante justifications and ex post justifications, as well as how these economic rationales
may differ across industries).
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reality, considered human-created when the “reality” is that a human
applied AI-based tools (or at the very least was significantly assisted by
AI242). From this discussion of two main normative theories of patents,
there is a surprising conclusion: there are strong normative grounds for
finding that patent protection should inhere in AI-generated output,
whether the output is generated by AI-based tools or the combination of
human-AI interaction, even when there is significant assistance by AI.
Further, based on the earlier discussion in Part I,243 the conclusion is
that there is no descriptive disconnection between human-generated
output and AI-generated output. From both descriptive and normative
positions,244 it seems that AI-generated output does, or should, attract
patent protection. Assuming that there should be patent protection in AIgenerated output, Part III considers how disclosure should be heightened
in response and the related effect on trade secrecy.
Before delving into the prescriptions for enhanced AI patent
disclosure in Part III,245 a discussion of the theories justifying246 greater
AI patent disclosure, including utilitarian and Lockean theories, is
warranted. Scholars have introduced other justifications and economic
reasoning for the patent system, and each has shed a new light on the
consequences for incentives and societal influence of patents. Edmund
Kitch’s 1977 article The Nature and Function of the Patent System
theorized that the patent system offers broad prospects at early stages of
development that encourage investment in that prospect ex post of the
patent grant.247 Clarissa Long’s 2002 article Patent Signals suggested
that patents reduce information asymmetries between inventors and
observers and could serve as signals to convey information and firm
attributes.248 Ted Sichelman’s 2010 article Commercializing Patents
stressed the role of patents for commercialization and proposed
decoupling the invention and commercialization functions of patents into
dual rights.249 This Part analyzes utilitarian economic justifications and
Lockean labor theory justifications for patents and is based on incentives
242. See McLaughlin, supra note 80, at 240–43 (establishing a spectrum of human
intervention in computer-assisted AI-generated inventions).
243. See supra Part I.
244. See supra Section II.C.
245. See infra Part III.
246. See Hilty et al., supra note 27 (addressing justifications for AI under
traditional IP theories).
247. See Kitch, supra note 241, at 267–71.
248. See Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002).
249. See generally Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341
(2010) (proposing “a new ‘commercialization patent,’ granted in exchange for the
commitment to make and sell a substantially novel product,” and in doing so, decoupling
patent law into an invention function and a commercialization function that would
improve commercialization).

2020] ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE INVENTIONS & PATENT DISCLOSURE

199

such that innovation would be at suboptimal levels absent the
incentives.250
1. Utilitarian Theories for Adequate AI-Generated Output
Utilitarianism is the dominant justification for U.S. patent law. The
U.S. Constitution’s grant for creating patent (and copyright) protection is
utilitarian and states that Congress may “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.”251 Much of the emphasis in U.S. patent law and many
of the normative views of patent scholars are utilitarian in nature.252 As
an example, the U.S. Supreme Court has invoked utilitarianism in
deciding patent-law cases.253 The utilitarian principle of seeking the
greatest good for the greatest number and its conceptions of utility, rather
than deontological perceptions of good, provide that we should grant
private property rights if doing so would increase overall social
welfare.254
Utilitarianism suggests that invention will only occur if there is
some sort of grant of exclusive rights, and it assumes that the patent grant
increases the production of new inventions. Although some scholarship
has noted that patents do not promote innovation,255 utilitarian principles
are invoked for the proposition that the grant of patents in an object will
increase the production of such objects.256 Thus, if a type of invented
object is assumed to be socially desirable, then an increase in these

250. See Kesan, supra note 28, at 898–99.
251. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
252. See Lee, supra note 29, at 325 (providing a counterargument and exception to
the generally held view that utilitarianism is dominant in U.S. patent law scholarship).
253. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
816 (1945).
254. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY (Harv. Univ.
Press 2004) (examining the interdisciplinary study of economics, history, psychology,
epistemology, and empiricism to provide a unified framework for disparate phenomena,
and in so doing, contributing to utilitarianism and applying cost-benefit analysis to parties
and judicial economy).
255. See generally Soma Dey, Are Patents Discouraging Innovation? (Nat’l Univ.
of Sing.), https://bit.ly/3fjfKcm (suggesting that the strategic complementarity between
patenting and R&D is relatively weaker in the presence of licensing and proposing that a
patent regime’s effect on R&D depends on the licensing environment); Bernard Girard,
Does ‘Strategic Patenting’ Threaten Innovation? And What Could Happen If It Did?
(Univ. of Que. at Montreal), https://bit.ly/2UCzujf (suggesting that overprotecting
intellectual property in general, and patents specifically, is not the only solution to
innovation; proposing that stronger intellectual property laws in the U.S. may not be good
for other nations; and noting that patent law may cause speculative bubbles that could
harm certain industries).
256. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
303 (1998) (suggesting that the utilitarian foundation promotes labor, which in turn
promotes public good).
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objects is also socially desirable. What, then, is the utilitarian
justification for patent protection of AI-generated output?
For most of the types of AI-generated output in question,257 their
production is presumably undetectable. However, to the inventor, the
creation of AI-generated output is of some significance. AI-assisted
inventors are spending money and time on research and development for
the application of AI-based tools and are placing a high value on the AIgenerated output that they create. However, the amount of time and
money that AI-assisted inventors spend on the AI-generated output that
they create is significantly less than it would be without the use of AIbased tools. From the utilitarian perspective, society should consider that
the grant of patents on adequate AI-generated output is justified based on
its value to the inventor. Even with a narrow view of the social utility of
AI-generated output, utilitarianism provides adequate justification for
considering such output as beneficial to society.
There are some objections to the grant of patents in AI-generated
output based on utilitarianism, the first of which stems from the
application of intellectual property law theories. While utilitarianism
may warrant some provision of exclusive rights to inventors, it is not an
unfettered warrant but, instead, has limitations on the granting of such
rights. For example, there may be limitations on the granting of patent
rights, such as the exclusivity period, for certain patentable subject
matter, even upon meeting the other patentability criteria. At this stage in
the development of AI, it may be too soon to ascertain the appropriate
balance of utilitarian interests and limitations. The second objection is
that granting patent protection to AI-generated output would reduce the
welfare and utility of human inventors and also reduce general societal
wellbeing.
This Article responds to such objections and concludes that patent
protection of AI-generated output can be recognized through engagement
in a social balancing act with enhanced patent disclosure.258 In doing so,
it argues that utilitarianism justifies patent protection of adequate AIgenerated output but not for the allocation of those interests. Thus, the

257. See supra Section I.B (summarizing the types of AI-generated output in
question as being potentially claimed in patent claims by: (1) claiming variations beyond
what the inventor actually invented to broaden claim scope; (2) disclosing (without
claiming) variations on existing patent claims and preventing future improvements to
destroy novelty; (3) claiming next incremental steps and adding claims in response on
demand to innovation developments in a certain field; and (4) claiming, by utilizing
analytical techniques and correlations, to assist inventor in predicting performance and
properties of inventions in the physical world; and (5) claiming prophecies with high
accuracy through computational experimentation to allow for an early patent grant).
258. See infra Part III.
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allocation issue is addressed through greater efforts required by the
inventor through enhanced patent disclosure.259
2. Lockean Theories for Adequate AI-Generated Output
It is fitting to consider how Locke’s theory of property might be
applied to AI-generated output. Locke’s conception of property stemmed
from his view of America as a boundless land.260 Despite the era in
which Locke wrote, one can make a comparison of Locke’s view on
property to the seemingly boundless modern-day environment of AI,
which is open-ended in its possible applications. At the same time, given
the scholarly debate on whether AI inventions can be attributed to the
human or to the AI,261 it is perhaps amusing that Lockean theory is
considered in an area like AI, for which an invention may be artificial
and arguably not human.
Locke’s central thesis was that if a person removes a resource from
nature and applies labor to it, that resource would become that person’s
property.262 In effect, Locke’s theory asserted that a person who
expended labor converting something in nature into something valuable
deserved some benefit for the effort.263
AI-generated output may have a property claim based on Lockean
theory. Like any other asset that emerges from an inventor’s time and
effort, AI-generated output is the product of an inventor’s labor. Some
might claim that the application of an AI-based tool to produce AIgenerated output is not labor. The Lockean perspective would hold that
there is no discernable distinction between AI-generated output and
human-generated output, especially in a world where AI usage is both
prevalent and undetectable. Anyone who has invented with the assistance
of AI-based tools can verify, “inventing” in the AI world involves less
labor and time than in the pre-AI world.
Some would object to granting patents for adequate AI-generated
output based on Locke’s labor theory; the first objection deals with the
degree of labor. The standard objection to Locke’s labor theory uses as
an example an action that provides little change, such as affecting only a
few molecules.264 However, there are defenses to this objection. For one,
Locke’s labor theory only grants property to labor that makes the greatest
part of the value, even in a small portion of the entire interest. Thus, for
259. See infra Part III.
260. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 290–91 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
261. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 1080; Abbott, supra note 80.
262. See LOCKE, supra note 260, at 290–91.
263. See id.
264. See Ofer Tur-Sinai, Beyond Incentives: Expanding the Theoretical Framework
for Patent Law Analysis, 45 AKRON L. REV. 243, 258 (2012).
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example, with AI-generated output, an inventor may not be able to claim
patent protection over its entirety, but only where the inventor’s labor
makes the greatest part of the value. Of course, this is exactly what
makes AI challenging, since it blurs the distinctions between the real and
artificial worlds.265 Additionally, another objection stems from the
Lockean proviso that the property is granted only where there is “enough
and as good left in common for others.”266 There is some merit to an
objection based on the Lockean proviso, since unlike the physical world,
the provision of property interests in adequate AI-generated output may
seem unlimited in a sense.
This Article responds to such objections and concludes in favor of
recognizing patent protection of AI-generated output, which, through
enhanced disclosure, enables humans to provide more labor.267 In so
doing, it argues that Lockean theory provides a justification for patent
protection of adequate AI-generated output, which is limited through acts
demonstrating labor and acts that inventors would deem worthy of
spending time and effort when they are of more value. Thus, the labor
issue is addressed through greater efforts required by the inventor
through enhanced patent disclosure.268
E. Toward an Enhanced Patent Disclosure &
Responding to Objections
One policy response to the challenge of AI-generated output and
unidentified inventions is to enhance the disclosure requirements for
obtaining a patent. For example, Congress might amend the Patent Act to
require greater disclosure on the part of the patent applicants, or courts
might interpret existing doctrines as mandating more stringent
disclosure. A requirement for greater disclosure would address any
utilitarian and Lockean objections269 to AI-generated output and would,
in theory, mitigate concerns with explainability and inscrutability of
AI.270 Moreover, enhanced disclosure would be consistent with legal
principles suggesting that patentees should not enjoy exclusive rights
while concealing useful information about their inventions.271 Indeed, it
would be very difficult for the USPTO to ascertain whether an invention
was produced as AI-generated output from the application of AI-based
tools. For example, a patent examiner cannot know the subjective

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See infra Part III.
Hughes, supra note 256, at 324.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See supra Sections II.D.1–II.D.2.
See supra Section I.B.
See In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
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contents of an inventor’s mind and, therefore, would be unaware of
whether the inventor utilized AI-based tools to produce AI-generated
output or produced human-generated output.272
While there are trade-offs with enhanced disclosure, this Article
proposes several prescriptions273 to maximize efficiency and minimize
drawbacks. In terms of maximizing efficiency, a trade-off arises
regarding enhancing patent disclosure. A heightened AI disclosure may
certainly impose high ex ante costs or time on inventors.274 Additionally,
an AI-technology-specific intervention has some perils that scholars have
noted, prompting them to advocate against abandoning uniformity. As it
may relate to both of these objections, a move toward a specialized
response to AI would entail higher administrative costs for the USPTO
and legislative reform. While these objections present challenges for
political economy and are not without merit, recognizing that AI presents
unique technological features275 would benefit patentability and patent
examination.
One of the central insights of the economics of patent law is that
context matters,276 and the key is to strike the right balance for any
technology-specific solution. In the context of software, patents have
become more difficult to identify and assess for patent examination at the
USPTO. As software patents have become increasingly obscure due to
abstruse writing and incomprehensible scope, software patents have
become increasingly difficult to search among and differentiate at the
272. However, the USPTO might have some options. Patent practitioners have a
duty of candor to the office, and USPTO regulations qualify that the duty of candor
requires disclosure of AI means used in the patent. The duty of candor requires that the
inventor and all individuals associated with the filing of the patent application disclose to
the USPTO all information that is known to be material to patentability, and as such, the
inventor should disclose when an AI-based tool has been used for AI-generated output. A
violation of the duty of candor can raise inequitable conduct issues during patent
litigation that could invalidate the entire patent—this should motivate the inventor to
specify the use of an AI-based tool. Nonetheless, without strong mechanisms (that are
easy to implement and cost-effective) for ascertaining a breach of the duty of candor, an
inventor may not be motivated to disclose the use of an AI-based tool to produce AIgenerated output.
Also, a patent examiner may consider written description and enablement to be
insufficient and require inventors to provide declarations supplementing the disclosure or
explaining how a person having ordinary skill in the art would understand how to make
and use the invention. Despite these options that are available to the patent examiner, the
lack of detectability when applying an AI-based tool necessitates greater patent
disclosure from societal and theoretical standpoints.
273. See infra Part III.
274. See infra Section III.A.1.
275. See supra Part I.
276. See Robert Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 839 (1990) (explaining that the economic
significance of a patent depends on its scope and, as a result, “the broader the scope, the
larger the number of competing products and processes that will infringe the patent”).
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USPTO.277 In many ways, this behavior reveals that software patents
demonstrate a related narrative of disclosure in patent application and
patent examination. AI magnifies this problem with software and
necessitates technology-specific intervention.
Additionally, because the current patent examination process is
incapable of distinguishing between AI-generated output and humangenerated output, an enhanced patent disclosure would promote the
incentives and justifications of the patent system. While there are tradeoffs with economic efficiency due to higher ex ante costs or time for
inventors, as seen in Part III, there are wider welfare-enhancing
benefits.278 Somewhat analogously, scholars have recommended other
policy levers to affect patenting behaviors with preferential treatment of
other technological areas.279 Ultimately, these technology-specific
developments help define a narrative of the policy response to
technological developments in patent law.
U.S. patent law should embrace the reality that AI-generated output
is already part of the invention process. The use of AI-based tools in the
invention process to produce AI-generated output is wholly consistent
with and advances the aims of the patent system, but only when there is
enhanced patent disclosure. Rather than viewing such AI inventions as
peripheral or exceptional, Congress, courts, and the USPTO should
promote a more robust vision of modern-day inventing. Accordingly, a
sketch of the contours of an enhanced AI patent disclosure—as provided
next in Part III280—would cultivate a more nuanced understanding of
what the patent system should be in an AI world.
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS, PRESCRIPTIONS, &
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The technological distinctions of AI explored in Part I and the
normative assessments explored in Part II raise several important
implications, normative considerations, and additional questions for
further study. Having examined the theories, justifications, and

277. Stephen Lindholm, Marking the Software Patent Beast, STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.,
Spring 2005, at 82, 82 (“[S]oftware patents are, practically speaking, hidden away in the
recesses of the patent office and practically impossible to find.”).
278. See infra Part III.
279. See Lucas S. Osborn et al., A Case for Weakening Patent Rights, 89 SAINT
JOHN’S L. REV. 1185, 1189, 1191 (2015) (assessing reducing the patent term as a policy
lever, and in so doing, arguing that since emerging technologies are altering relative costs
and benefits of the patent system, lawmakers should weaken patent rights by 25–50%);
Anton et al., supra note 63, at 2 (suggesting that the level of patent strength is a policy
lever that will affect innovation, organizational incentives, and entrepreneurial activity
tied to patents).
280. See infra Part III.
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normative assessment of enhanced patent disclosure for AI, an important
question arises: how should the law respond? Accordingly, this Part
prescribes more robust patent disclosure of AI. Although this Part’s
primary aim is to describe various proposals for enhancing patent
disclosure of AI-generated output, some preliminary normative
considerations and normative implications are in order.
A. Normative Implications of Enhanced AI Disclosure
Having examined the technological distinction of AI and the
application of AI-based tools to produce AI-generated output, an
important question arises: what are the necessary considerations and
implications of any proposed prescriptions? Accordingly, it is important
to engage in a normative evaluation of any prescription. Indeed, much is
at stake here, for the use of AI represents a great portion of inventing and
results in unidentified inventions.281 Society should care about patents
associated with imaginary, never-achieved, or unworkable disclosure but
that appear to reasonable onlookers of the patent document as though
they were created, tested, or made workable. Congress should enact
reforms to the patent system to require greater disclosure of AI-generated
output of inventions that were hardly (or never) developed or were
effectively concealed through an unexplainable algorithmic inventive
process. This Article argues that while AI-generated output is worthy of
patent protection, there should be enhanced patent disclosure to balance
societal welfare.282 The prescriptions presented here raise two primary
concerns: (1) greater ex ante inventor costs and efforts for AI inventors,
and (2) a possible move toward trade secrecy for AI inventions.
1. Greater ex ante Inventor Costs and Efforts for AI Inventors
There is an optimal patent policy balance between encouraging the
creation and disclosure of advances in AI technology by providing
incentives for innovation while weighing the costs and efforts for the
inventor.283 That being said, while enhanced AI disclosure may require
greater incentives for the AI invention, such concerns raise special
considerations in the context of more effort toward reduction to practice
for an AI inventor. This analysis provides a normative evaluation of ex
ante inventor costs and efforts required by enhanced AI patent
disclosure. In particular, proposals to enhance AI patent disclosure would

281. See Iancu AI Policy Update, supra note 48.
282. See Miller, supra note 40, at 196.
283. See id. at 196–97 (recognizing that enhanced patent disclosure would result in
an increased cost to patent applicants in initial filing of the patent application but would
result in a large social benefit).
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have to counter the historical departure from greater disclosure in patent
law’s history.
Early in patent law’s history, the requirement for a close connection
to the physical “working” of the claimed invention in the form of
physical embodiments was high.284 Since then, there has been a shift
away from actual reduction to practice of the invention, which has
brought patent disclosure to the forefront. Due to a host of developments,
interpretation of federal patent law and statutes, and interpretations by
courts and the USPTO, the physical-based requirements gradually shifted
from submission of a physical model of the invention to a commercial
working of the invention to constructive reduction to practice.285
Contemporary patent law views the filing of the patent application
as a representation that the invention is capable of actually working if it
were built, but the inventor is not required to build it, practice it, or make
it.286 The shifting normative status of the type of disclosure has reduced
the amount of evidence required to show an invention would actually
work. This shifting disclosure is part of a broader structural trend in
patent law of not accounting for the evolution of the PHOSITA with the
progression of computing and software technology.287 In many ways, the
developments of AI technology described here reflect increased tensions
between software technologies and patent disclosure.
Such a decreased emphasis on disclosure in patent law raises a
special concern in the context of AI, for its technological distinction with
explainability and inscrutability further dampens the benefits of the
teaching function and knowledge spillovers of patent disclosure.288
Furthermore, the high degree of trifling inventions that are reaching the
USPTO,289 especially in light of the potential flood of unidentified
inventions with AI-generated output at the USPTO, further justifies
enhancing modern-day patent disclosure. The USPTO has provided
guidance for AI inventors to better demonstrate greater AI patent
disclosure.290 The USPTO’s guidance documents aim to improve the
284. See Cotropia, supra note 32, at 1545.
285. See id. at 1545, 1549–51, 1554, 1563; John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper
Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1368–71 (2013).
286. See Duffy, supra note 285, at 1366.
287. See Samuel Adams, Law and Economics of Software Patent Disclosure 38–39
(Nov. 10, 2008) (unpublished LL.M. IP Thesis, Munich Intell. Prop. L. Ctr.),
://bit.ly/2ZG49PZ.
288. See Deepak Hegde et al., Patent Publication and Innovation 2–5 (Jan. 20,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://bit.ly/3efTKi6.
289. See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law, 22 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 75, 75 (2008).
290. See generally 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guide, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (providing a guide, as well as a flowchart and examples,
concerning assessment of the threshold question of whether a patent’s claimed subject

2020] ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE INVENTIONS & PATENT DISCLOSURE

207

clarity, consistency, and predictability of patent examination of AI
inventions, particularly by defining what is and is not patent-eligible as
applied to inventions associated with the USPTO’s Class 706.291 Turning
to the prescriptive, Section III.B292 returns to the question of how the
patent system should promote greater AI disclosure,293 primarily through
the lens of other possible USPTO actions.
2. Possible Move Toward Trade Secrecy for AI Inventions
Patents and trade secrets occupy opposite ends of the disclosure
spectrum and achieve their goals through different mechanisms. The
patent bargain requires a disclosure of the invention for limited-term
monopoly protection until the patent’s expiration, whereas a trade secret
lacks an expiration date and loses protection with reverse engineering or
independent invention. Patents have strength in enforcement over trade
secrets since patents can be enforced against anyone making, using, or
selling the invention. A recent AI patent infringement294 case,
matter is within the realm of topics that are even eligible for patenting and, in so doing,
demonstrating what can be disclosed and written to meet patent eligibility and indirectly
provide greater disclosure).
291. See Classification Resources: Data Processing – Artificial Intelligence, U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://bit.ly/2B7YGYd (last visited May 27, 2020). The
subject matter of this technological class is described as being:
[A]rtificial intelligence type computers and digital data processing systems and
corresponding data processing methods and products for emulation of
intelligence (i.e., knowledge based systems, reasoning systems, and knowledge
acquisition systems); and including systems for reasoning with uncertainty
(e.g., fuzzy logic systems), adaptive systems, machine learning systems, and
artificial neural networks.
Id.
292. See infra Section III.B.
293. See supra Section II.E.
294. At first blush, AI patent infringement might seem preposterous in multiple
ways.
One scenario relates to when an AI-based tool operates in a way that unexpectedly
infringes a patentee’s patent. In such a scenario, when an AI-based tool invents
independently of a human, a question arises as to whether the AI-based tool can be found
to have infringed on a patented invention when the human that uses the AI-based tool is
unaware of the AI-based tool’s potential to infringe another’s patent. Even though the
unpredictable and challenging-to-reproduce nature of an AI-based tool may cause some
pause on the basic presumptions of the patent infringement statute, it should be noted that
the AI-based tool is like any other tool, and the human as the user of the tool would be
found liable for patent infringement (not the tool itself). The AI-based tool should not be
found to be the infringer. After all, because there is a human that is behind the
development of the AI-based tool in some way, the AI-based tool cannot be seen as being
purely autonomous. Even though an AI-based tool can produce some AI-generated output
independent of the human (or as this Article assesses, inscrutable AI-generated output
from an AI-based tool lacking explainability), the AI-based tool is a product of human
ingenuity, and a human can be considered a patent infringer even without knowing that
the AI-based tool was producing AI-generated output that infringes on another’s patent.
Moreover, while a patentee may be concerned when another human uses an AI-based tool
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PurePredictive, Inc. v. H20.AI, Inc.,295other AI patent litigation cases,296
and PTAB proceedings297 represent signs of more AI enforcement

that produces unexpected AI-generated output that infringes on the patentee’s patent, it
may never be noticed by the patentee.
Another scenario concerning the possibility of AI patent infringement relates to
when the patentee of the AI-based tool sues another party for patent infringement. The
other party may seek to invalidate the patentee’s patent, since patents directed to AI and
based on algorithms and statistics may be invalidated in district courts or in post-issuance
administrative proceedings at the USPTO.
The aforementioned scenarios provide a preliminary analysis. However, the prospect
of AI patent infringement requires a deeper analysis of the following questions: Can AI
(or some aspect of AI) infringe on patent rights? Who or what entities should be liable for
actions taken by AI, if it could infringe on a patent? Should these questions differ in the
case of AI that infringes on a patent whose inventor is a human versus the case of AI that
infringes on a patent whose conception was performed by AI? While a preliminary
analysis was performed here, a deeper assessment of these questions is outside of the
scope of this Article and would require grappling with the fundamental notion of who or
what type of entity could be an “infringer” and exploring the way the patent system can
respond to protect patent owners against appropriations of their inventions by use of AI.
A detailed exploration of the various applications and uses of AI under 35 U.S.C. § 271
that constitute patent infringement would require an assessment of the theories and causes
of action of patent infringement, including the nuances of indirect infringement, divided
infringement, and infringing uses with the use of AI.
295. See PurePredictive, Inc. v. H2O.AI, Inc., No. 17-cv-03049-WHO, 2017 WL
3721480, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2017), aff’d, 741 F. App’x 802 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(addressing U.S. patent 8,880,446, which concerned automatically generating an
ensemble of machine learning models, such that the collection of such models cooperated
to generate accurate predictions or a classifications by repeated exposures to training data
with little to no input from users through evaluating a number of different learned
functions).
296. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 78 F. Supp. 3d 884,
885–86 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff’d, 635 F. App’x 914 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding claims
directed to an expert system for detection of impairment of human operators were
ineligible); Hyper Search, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 17-1387-CFC-SRF, 2018 WL
6617143, at *10 (D. Del. Dec. 17, 2018) (finding the claims to be invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 for reciting a neural-network module that was limited to an abstract idea);
Neochloris, Inc. v. Emerson Process Mgmt. LLP, 140 F. Supp. 3d 763, 773 (N.D. Ill.
2015) (finding the claims to be ineligible for reciting an artificial network module akin to
a black box without any limitations on the system).
297. See generally Ex parte Hamilton, No. 2017-008577, 2018 WL 6428478
(P.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2018) (rejecting a claim directed to a method of planning and paying
for advertisements in a virtual universe via a set of virtual agents controlled by artificial
intelligence); Ex parte Pizzorno, No. 2017-002355, 2018 WL 4846938 (P.T.A.B. Sept.
19, 2018) (affirming a rejection of a patent claim directed to “a computer implemented
method useful for improving artificial intelligence technology” as abstract); Ex parte
Lyren, No. 2016-008571, 2018 WL 3391361 (P.T.A.B. June 25, 2018) (rejecting a claim
directed to customizing video on a computer as being abstract and thus not patent
eligible); Ex parte Mitzlaff, No. 2016-003447, 2018 WL 1737978 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27,
2018) (rejecting claims directed to a computer-implemented method designed to simulate
a conversation of a user of a computer-implemented conversational agent as being too
abstract, and finding that embodiments involving complex trained artificial intelligence
algorithms did not identify anything more than routine and conventional technologies).
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actions,298 including divided infringement possibilities299 that suggest
some strategic patent drafting considerations.300 The objective
construction of patent liability makes patent-based protection more
attractive, as it is a form of strict liability that requires no knowledge or
intention on the part of the alleged infringer.301 Moreover, patent
protection can capture small changes under the doctrine of equivalents,302
and secondary liability for indirect patent infringement extends to a
broader class of actors. By contrast, trade-secret protection is essentially
a form of protection that extends liability for unlawful acquisition
without the consent of the trade-secret holder.
An enhanced AI patent disclosure would push some AI inventors
toward trade secrecy. In addition to increased ex ante costs and efforts
with providing more disclosure in the patent application, AI inventors
may find trade secrecy to be beneficial in other respects.303 AI’s
298. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 2019:
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 111 (2019) (noting that, while not comprehensive, initial
worldwide data reveals 1,264 artificial intelligence patent families mentioned in litigation
cases, 4,231 mentioned in opposition cases, and 492 mentioned in both types of case; of
these cases, 73% of the identified litigation cases involving artificial intelligence patents
were filed in the U.S.).
299. See Nathaniel Grow, Resolving the Divided Patent Infringement Dilemma, 50
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 3–4 (2016); W. Keith Robinson, Using Interactive Inventions,
69 DEPAUL L. REV. 95, 96, 100 (2019) (introducing interactive inventions as being
systems and processes that can be used by multiple actors at the same time, and in so
doing, assessing liability associated with patent infringement, including the issue of
divided infringement where the performance of the interactive method patent claim is
split among multiple parties, actors, or devices); Christopher J. White & Hamid R.
Piroozi, Drafting Patent Applications Covering Artificial Intelligence Systems,
LANDSLIDE, Jan./Feb. 2019, at 12, 16, https://bit.ly/3fbzcYf (explaining that a method
claim to an AI model training technique is infringed when the patentee asserts a patent
infringement claim against the producer of the training software, and that divided
infringement may occur with the use of AI when a party does not train models itself in an
attempt to divide infringement between itself and the end users of its software).
300. Divided infringement occurs when the actions of multiple entities are
combined to perform every step of a claimed method, but no single party acting alone has
completed the entire patented method. Furthermore, the multiple parties can be located in
different jurisdictions. In order to avoid divided infringement, there are some strategic
patent-claims-drafting considerations that AI inventors should keep in mind: (1) A patent
claim reciting the use of a trained model without requiring any particular training process
would likely be infringed by only one party; (2) A patent claim reciting the use of a
training process without requiring any particular trained model would likely be infringed
by only one party; (3) Since training data may come from numerous sources, a claim
reciting “receiving training data” may implicate multiple parties.
301. See Anton et al., supra note 63, at 5–6 (suggesting that strong patents give the
patent holder stronger protection against patent infringement).
302. See Meurer & Nard, supra note 126, at 1948 and accompanying text.
303. Additionally, the uncertain scope of AI protection under patent law, such as
with patent eligibility and non-obviousness, may make trade secrecy a more realistic
alternative. A lack of clear patentability for AI makes patent protection less favorable
since enforcement against patent infringement would be more problematic. While
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explainability and inscrutability make reverse engineering more
difficult.304 An enhanced AI patent disclosure would enable the inventor
to capture small changes under the doctrine of equivalents305 and protect
against something similar. Turning to the prescriptive, Section III.B306
returns to the question of how the patent system should promote greater
AI disclosure307 to provide such benefits and incentives for AI inventors.
B. Assessments & Prescriptions for Enhanced AI Disclosure
The concern with inscrutability and reproducibility308 that results
from the use of AI-based tools sheds new light on the longstanding
debate over patent disclosure and incentives for inventors. The patent
system is meant to incentivize inventors, but increasingly patent
examiners are presented with imaginary, never-achieved, or unworkable
inventions that appear to reasonable onlookers of a patent application as
though they were created, tested, or made workable. Patent examiners
must take the patent application at face value, yet legitimate-sounding
diagrams and descriptions of the invention might in fact be illegitimate,
as a result of AI-based tools; the patent system should evolve in
response. The USPTO cannot reasonably expect patent examiners to
confirm whether the patent application is for an invention that is
fictitious or unexplainable in an era of increasing usage of AI-based
tools, and heightened disclosure provides a better verification mechanism
for society.
Recall that scholars have long argued over the costs and benefits of
patent disclosure.309 Drawing on the foregoing accounts,310 this Section
argues that greater AI disclosure by the inventors has benefits that
outweigh the costs and provides proposals that would counter patent
protection for AI-generated output. Given the social welfare benefits
yielded by greater AI disclosure, such calibration is worth pursuing.311
misappropriation and independent invention create a loss in trade secrecy protection and
are concerns for an AI inventor considering trade secrecy, patent protection may not be
desirable to pursue unless patent disclosure is enhanced for AI inventions.
304. It should be noted that reverse engineering barriers may not be that high in
some cases, in which trade secrecy would not block involuntary dissemination.
Moreover, AI patent owners may license a method to others, in which case patenting
similarly does not block voluntary dissemination.
305. See Meurer & Nard, supra note 126, at 1948 and accompanying text.
306. See infra Section III.B.
307. See supra Section II.E.
308. See supra Section I.B.
309. See supra Section II.B.
310. See supra Section II.B.
311. See generally Adam Mossoff, Testimony on the STRONGER Patents Act
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Intellectual Property Subcomittee (Geo. Mason
L. & Econs. Research Nos. 19-32, 2019), https://bit.ly/2UGLgtc (proposing that Congress
restore reliable and effective patent rights, in part to foster the next generation of
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Enhanced patent disclosure for AI has an important role to play in
equilibrating an appropriate level of quid pro quo. Along these lines, this
Section takes the view that the USPTO can and should enact proposals to
enhance AI patent disclosure that fit within its agency authority,312
without creating rulemaking in patent law.313
1. Establishing Disclosure Incentives for the Inventor
Enhanced patent disclosure for AI plays an important role in
incentivizing disclosure of unidentified inventions in the form of AIgenerated output in patent applications examined at the USPTO. Along
these lines, a prudent response is not to ban the AI-generated output, but
to develop an enhanced disclosure mechanism to incentivize AI
inventors to explain how the applied AI-based tools develop AIgenerated output.
However, there are trade-offs to enhanced AI patent disclosure. The
more incentives that are provided by the USPTO to disclose, the more
difficult it will be to implement. Moreover, greater AI patent disclosure
incentives will require greater ex ante costs and time for inventors. The
added disclosure will require the inventor to spend more money on
attorney time as the cost of writing an AI patent application will increase.
Another cost borne by the AI inventor would be the increased risk of
inequitable conduct.314 On the one hand, the potential for added
inequitable conduct risk may lead some AI inventors to refrain from
providing enhanced AI patent disclosure. On the other hand, a more
enticing incentive for inventors may cause them to over-disclose to avoid
inequitable conduct and place a greater administrative burden on patent
examiner. The risk that patent litigators may introduce inequitable
conduct by AI inventors may be high enough to prevent enhanced AI
patent disclosure measures.315 Additionally, there will be increased
innovations in AI since extensive changes to the patent system have weakened patents
and sowed legal uncertainty, which requires a recalibration).
312. See Robert P. Merges, The Hamiltonian Origins of the U.S. Patent System, and
Why They Matter Today, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2559, 2588 (2019) (explaining that the
USPTO is an expert agency that has the authority to make rules that govern its internal
proceedings and make rules on procedural matters, but that it is not an agency the
possesses the power to issue binding rules with the force of law, such as on patentability).
313. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2018).
314. See generally Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton
Dickinson: A First Impression, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 226 (2012) (specifying that
inequitable conduct is a judicially-created doctrine developed to punish inventors who
behave inappropriately during patent prosecution); see also MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan.
2018) § 1448.
315. See Lee Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An
Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295, 1299 (2010) (describing that
inequitable conduct is a “plague” that permeates patent litigation and strikes fear in the
hearts of inventors).
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administrative costs for the USPTO based on the costs of incentives for
enhanced AI patent disclosure. Given the overburdened USPTO,
additional fees may be necessary to offset the cost of any enhanced AI
patent disclosure program. The additional costs for the inventor and the
USPTO will depend on the level of enhanced disclosure required.
This Article proposes a few incentive options for enhanced AI
patent disclosure. The most highly recommended proposals—optional AI
patent disclosure, prioritized AI examination, and reduced maintenance
fees—would necessitate a few USPTO procedural changes. Additional
proposals with more substantial incentive levels—a greater patent term
for enhanced AI patent disclosure and a requirement for complete AI
patent disclosure—would necessitate some legislative action. In sum, the
prescriptions provided represent a spectrum of disclosure solutions for
AI’s explainability and inscrutability challenges with patent law and
address adequate disclosure to identify the AI inventive method applied
for producing AI-generated output.
Foremost, optional AI patent disclosure and prioritized AI
examination would necessitate a few USPTO procedural changes but not
a legislative overhaul. This first prescription of disclosure incentives
concerns mostly relatively easy-to-implement procedural reforms at the
USPTO that fit within its agency authority. There could be an increasing
range of greater incentives, which could be analogized as being a larger
set of carrots on a stick.
The level of incentive could be optional AI patent disclosure that
would allow an AI inventor to voluntarily identify the AI inventive
method utilized to generate AI output. The USPTO could provide a
survey mechanism to enable an AI inventor to identify the AI inventive
method applied toward their AI-generated output. The USPTO survey
could be provided in the patent application filing process and enable the
AI inventor to identify their use of a particular AI-based tool, including
an open-source library, training data,316 or output data. Inventors would
have minimal to no incentive to disclose because the optional AI
disclosure via a survey or a form would be left up to the inventors’
choice. Still, while such an optional AI patent disclosure would not
provide much incentive to AI inventors, it would serve a notice-serving
function and could act as defensive patenting strategy to block follow-on
inventors from applying the same technique.
The second level of incentive on this spectrum of disclosure
solutions is priority examination, which would enable patent applications
that provide disclosure of the AI inventive process to attain a higher

316. See Taddy, supra note 89, at 1; see also MUNRO & MIRSHARIF, supra note 58,
at 10.
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priority for patent examination. This incentive refers to providing an
inventor an earlier place in line to enable a quicker review of the patent
application by the USPTO when there is greater disclosure provided by
the inventor. The USPTO has already had priority examination
programs,317 and an AI disclosure program could provide a petition for
specially expedited examination. The prospect of an expedited patent
application could provide a generous disclosure incentive.
A third level of incentive for disclosure on this spectrum is reduced
maintenance fees, which would encourage AI inventors to disclose the
AI inventive process by making the cost of patent maintenance more
affordable.318 This incentive refers to charging a lower cost to maintain
the patent ex post, or after issuance, but would require the inventor to
adequately disclose the AI ex ante, or before issuance. If the USPTO
lowered the renewal-maintenance fees of AI patents, then AI patents
would become stronger.319 Similar to reduced maintenance fees for small
and micro entities, lower maintenance fees for AI patent applications
would provide greater incentives for the patenting of such inventions. In
sum, optional AI patent disclosure, prioritized AI examination, and
reduced maintenance fees would provide enhanced disclosure incentives
to AI inventors with minimal procedural changes at the USPTO.
The three incentive levels represent a spectrum of disclosure
incentives, are greater incentives for AI than in present day, and would
not require legislative action. Other proposals with more substantial
incentive levels—a greater patent term for enhanced AI patent disclosure
and a requirement for complete AI patent disclosure—would necessitate
rulemaking changes. The USPTO is charged with establishing
regulations that are consistent with the patent laws that govern its
proceedings,320 but it does not have rulemaking authority.321 Therefore,
adding a greater patent term, or adding additional years of patent
protection for disclosing an AI inventive method, would require an act of
Congress. The Patent Act would need to be amended to identify what
317. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, The U.S. Commerce
Department’s Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) Will Pilot a Program to Accelerate
the Examination of Certain Green Technology Patent Applications (Dec. 7, 2009) (on file
with the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office).
318. See MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) § 2506.
319. See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325,
360–63 (2012) (discussing an increase in maintenance fees as a deterrent to nonpracticing entity patent litigation); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation
Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1357 (2013); Lucas Osborn et al., supra note 279, at 1191
(noting that raising maintenance and renewal fees would weaken patents, and thus,
lowering maintenance and renewal fees would strengthen patents).
320. See MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) § 1001.
321. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2018).
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would serve as an AI inventive disclosure and provide the extra term for
the added disclosure. Subsequent to Congress’s passing of this law, the
USPTO would need to develop its procedure and examination
capabilities for its execution. This process would take many years but,
upon its conclusion, would provide a strong incentive for an AI inventor
to provide enhanced AI patent disclosure. An even stronger incentive for
an AI inventor would be to require complete AI patent disclosure simply
to qualify for a complete patent application. In other words, this
prescription would do more than merely encourage disclosure; disclosure
would be a patent-application requirement to qualify for examination of a
submitted patent application. Similar to other requirements, such as
payment of a fee and submission of an oath under 35 U.S.C. § 111, a
complete AI patent disclosure would be necessary for the AI inventor’s
patent application to be complete. Thus, unlike the statutory requirement
in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a),322 this proposal would address a patent
application’s completeness or incompleteness. Similar to the proposed
greater patent term, an AI inventor would have a strong incentive to
provide such disclosure or else would be unable to proceed in the patent
prosecution process and would receive a Notice of Missing Parts from
the USPTO. This strong incentive would require revisions to the Patent
Act to specify requirements for AI inventors to satisfactorily complete
the patent application under 35 U.S.C. § 111.
In sum, some proposals would require procedural changes, and
others would require legislative actions. While the proposals for
procedural changes would be easier to implement, the proposals for
legislative actions would take time and receive resistance from various
industry groups and lobbyists. In particular, organizations that would
oppose greater ex ante inventor costs and time in the invention process
could thwart any legislative change. Alternatively, a data deposit
requirement would be easier to implement because the USPTO could
draw on prior comparable circumstances to aid in its implementation.
2. Establishing a Data Deposit as an Alternative Disclosure
While this Article takes a general salutary view of enhanced AI
patent disclosure of AI-generated output, in some cases, AI-generated
output is not solely produced from the application of AI-based tools. A

322. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018). This section states that:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . .
Id.
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combination of human-machine interaction,323 or the use of AI together
with human input,324 can produce AI-generated output. Thus, a potential
challenge in advocating for enhanced AI patent disclosure is that AIgenerated output may be the result of minimal AI application. Along
these lines, some consider that a stronger AI disclosure may be
unwarranted if AI technology has not advanced to the point of having the
sole or even substantial ability to contribute to the conception of an
invention.325 Nevertheless, when AI-based tools confer meaningful
autonomy to inventions, there may be societal benefits for similar
incentives and justifications326 for some form of enhanced AI patent
disclosure. In such cases, enhanced AI patent disclosure may be
warranted for certain AI-based tools.
A potential—though ultimately a time-consuming and difficult—
legislative reform would be to enact a statute for patent protection with a
data deposit requirement akin to that provided for seeds of plants, which
provides biological sequence listings (such as for DNA) to the USPTO.
Similar to the biological context, where the inner processes are not fully
understood and a deposit of certain materials could satisfy teaching the
public in lieu of a textual explanation in a patent application, a deposit of
certain data in the AI context could serve an analogous role. For instance,
a deposit requirement or some form of a repository could be accessible to
the public and satisfy enablement of the patentability statute similar to
the biological context and the Plant Patents Act (PPA).327 The objective
of enacting such a statutory reform would be to provide an alternative
form of patent protection and, in so doing, provide enhanced AI patent
disclosure, when utility patent protection is unachievable for AIgenerated output. This Article has argued that the explainability and
inscrutability considerations of applying AI-based tools to produce AIgenerated output warrant an enhanced AI patent disclosure system. In
theory, the USPTO could heighten the disclosure requirement for AI
inventions through USPTO procedural reforms,328 thus strengthening the
ability of AI patents to promote knowledge spillovers and, ultimately, AI

323. See GUY A. BOY, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN-MACHINE INTERACTION 3–4
(Guy A. Boy ed., 2011) (explaining human-machine interaction form analysis, design,
and evaluation perspectives, including principles, methods, techniques, and tools).
324. See Mühlhoff, supra note 109, at 6–8 (providing and explaining as an example
the use of a CAPTCHA, which requires the response of a human user as training data for
an AI application).
325. See Memorandum from R Street on Patenting of Artificial Intelligence
Inventions (Nov. 13, 2019) (on file with the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office).
326. See supra Section II.D.
327. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–64 (2018).
328. See supra Section III.B.1.
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innovation.329 However, such an approach could be unavailing for AI
inventions that do not meet the definiteness requirements of 35 U.S.C. §
112 and, hence, do not warrant patent protection.
AI patent protection similar to the PPA could take the form of a data
deposit requirement. The key here is to produce patent protection and
greater disclosure of the Article’s second scenario, “Un-disclosed AIbased tool,”330 akin to that of plant patent protection331 and the biological
deposits and sequence listings.332 Just a deposits in the biological and
plant contexts represent starting materials, a data deposit in the AI
context could provide the starting data set for subsequent AI-generated
output. Similarly, Congress should enact a statute to allow for a public
deposit of data in the AI context.
Similar to the PPA, which requires an inventor to submit both a
complete description of the plant variety and an explanation of how a
particular type of plant includes the right to exclude others from
asexually reproducing the plant,333 a data deposit could require similar
disclosure of AI-based tools to provide patent protection. Similar to
information embedded in seeds being amenable to various forms of
proprietary protection,334 the information in data that is trained with AIbased tools to produce AI-generated output should have similar patent
protection upon deposit of the AI training data. The AI inventor could be
329. See Exec. Order No. 13859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb. 11, 2019); NAT’L SCI. &
TECH. COUNCIL, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE NATIONAL
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLAN: 2019 UPDATE,
at iii (2019); CENTER FOR THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, WORLD ECONOMIC
FORUM, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE COLLIDES WITH PATENT LAW 4 (2018); Asay, supra
note 1, at 1187; Bessen et. al., supra note 2; Furman & Seamans, supra note 2.
330. See supra Section I.B (referring to the claiming of an AI-based tool, without
disclosure of how the AI operates, such as when an inventor claims the AI, which refers
to the AI engine or the AI techniques inside of the AI-based tool, but does not disclose
how an invention is made by the AI-based tool).
331. See Michael Blakeney, Patenting of Plant Varieties and Plant Breeding
Methods, 63 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL BOTANY 3 (2012); Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan,
Intellectual Property Protection for Plant Innovation: Unresolved Issues After J.E.M. v.
Pioneer, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1161, 1161–62 (2002) (noting that plants are
eligible for patent protection under the utility patent regime, the Plant Patent Act, and the
Plant Variety Protection Act); Elisa Rives, Mother Nature and the Courts: Are Sexually
Reproducing Plants and their Progeny Patentable Under the Utility Patent Act of 1952?,
32 CUMB. L. REV. 187, 187 (2002) (explaining that the case of Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc.
v. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. helped to “resolve the issue of whether the Plant Patent Act of
1930 (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA) ‘[were] the exclusive
forms of protection for plant life’”).
332. See MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) § 2403.
333. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–64 (2018) (requiring that a complete description of the
plant variety be submitted before a patent is used).
334. See Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety
Protection Act in Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 108
(2005).
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required to submit AI training data or an AI-based tool to the USPTO,
similar to the requirement of submitting a deposit seed or other
propagation material capable of producing claimed plants, wherein the
deposits are treated as part of the applicant’s disclosure.335 Just as a
deposit of active biological material, whose inner-workings are difficult
to replicate or understand, provides the public with access to how to
make and use it, AI training data deposits can serve the same purpose in
the AI context.
Biological deposits and sequence listings make another useful
analogy to AI-based tools for patent disclosure. Biological deposits,
which have been used to satisfy the enablement and written description
requirement for inventions in the U.S. since 1949, provide a means for
making biological material publicly available as a clearinghouse for
reference samples of biological materials.336 Similar to the biological
deposit system that serves to remedy the fact that newly isolated or
created biological material cannot always be reproduced from a written
description, AI-generated output produced by AI-based tools may not be
reproducible. For example, a deposit of AI training data or an AI-based
tool could be provided in written form and furnished to the USPTO337 as
a deposit akin to that of nucleotide or amino acid sequences.338 Just as the
biological deposit requirement can provide a solution to the enablement
problem of biological deposits and sequence listings,339 a deposit of AI
training data or an AI-based tool to the USPTO could more appropriately
fulfill patent disclosure.
Such disclosure via a deposit would entail a description of how or
why an AI-based tool would generate certain AI-generated output.
Similar to the multi-tiered system to protect plant varieties340 and
biological deposits and sequence listings,341 data deposits for AI would
provide an alternative form of protection that should be enacted into a
statute, so as to enable the disclosure of a different variety of AI that may
335. See generally Daniel J. Knauss et al., Protecting Plants Inventions, 11
LANDSLIDE 6, July/Aug. 2019 (pointing out that it is “possible for innovators to obtain
multiple formal protections for their new varieties, provided they meet the statutory
requirements for each form,” when the applicant “deposit[s] seed or other propagation
material capable of producing the claimed plants . . . as part of the applicant’s
disclosure”).
336. See David J. Weitz, The Biological Deposit Requirement: A Means of Assuring
Adequate Disclosure, 8 HIGH TECH L.J. 275, 280, 281 (1993).
337. See MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) § 2431.
338. See id. § 2424.
339. See Eileen M. Woo, Enabling Life, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1060, 1076 (2016).
340. See generally CHRISTIE M. HAYES & GREGORY RILEY, A GUIDE TO PLANT
PATENTS FOR PENNSYLVANIA’S GROWERS, PENN ST. DICK. AGRIC. L. RESOURCE &
REFERENCE CTR. (2002) (describing a three-tiered U.S. system to protect plant varieties
via the Plant Protection Act, the Plant Variety Protection Act, and utility patents).
341. See MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) § 2403.
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not be promoted by disclosure incentives. A trade-off would be an
increased cost of obtaining patents, which would shift the cost-benefit
balance of obtaining a patent. There could be greater ex ante efforts by
the inventor and greater ex post administrative examination burdens for
the USPTO to carry out these disclosure mechanisms. This increased
cost would also decrease the cost borne by other inventors researching a
similar application or field by minimizing duplicated efforts. However, a
societal loss exists when the public cannot practice the AI invention
absent a deposit.
Policymakers should consider incentivizing the greater disclosure of
AI-based tools and AI-generated output as a means of preventing the
socially harmful tragedy of the anticommons.342 Society would be
negatively impacted by underuse and waste caused by unclear rights in
upstream training data343 and algorithms from insufficient patent
disclosure. As a result of not disclosing and demarcating rights to use of
training data and algorithms when producing AI-generated output, there
could be negative impact to downstream innovation.344
C. Future Directions
This Article broadens the perspective of contemporary inventions
and observes that greater attention should be given to the role of AI in
shaping patentability and patent examination through enhanced
disclosure. As noted, the traditional view in patent law has focused on
the role of the human in the invention process to provide a claimed
invention based on human-generated output. This Article has introduced
a valuable and challenging line of inquiry, which has explored the effects
of both AI-based tools and AI-generated output on patentability and
patent examination. As this Article has shown, AI-generated output can
challenge the adequacy of patent disclosure and can have a significant
impact on USPTO patent examination by making it more difficult to
distinguish AI-generated output from claimed human-generated output.
While some scholars have richly pursued the doctrinal patentability
challenges of AI in the invention process,345 more attention to the
structural implications of disclosure by inventors and detection of
disclosure by the USPTO was warranted.

342. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 698.
343. See Hacker, supra note 58 (stating that training data is of fundamental
importance for the development of AI applications).
344. See Jorge L. Contreras, The Anticommons at Twenty: Concerns for Research
Continue, 361 SCIENCE, July 2018, at 335, 335–37 (suggesting that underutilization of
resources would add to the cost and slowing of the pace of downstream innovation); see
also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
345. See Ramalho, supra note 10, at 2.
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Along these lines, this Article’s theoretical contributions define a
framework for verifying underpinnings concerning AI patent disclosure
and provide further examination of related topics. This Article has relied
on technological taxonomy,346 theory, and normative assessments347 to
provide prescriptions for enhanced AI patent disclosure.348 While there
are benefits of enhanced AI patent disclosure to an inventor, such as
protection against patent infringement,349 a natural inquiry is whether an
AI inventor will opt for trade secrecy or patent protection for AI
inventions and, if so, for which aspects. In other words, this Article calls
for further empirical examination to elucidate and quantify the AI
intellectual-property-protection strategic decision via patents or trade
secrets.
Scholars have determined that the strategic decision to pursue
patents, trade secrets, or a combination thereof during the innovative
process is highly contextual.350 Empirical studies that compare the tradeoffs and use of patents versus trade secrets are scant.351 Subsequent
research in AI invention can supplement the existing literature with
examples and conclusions drawn from a series of evidence-based
insights drawn from semi-structured interviews with professionals
(technologists, managers, business strategy leaders of multinationals,
investors, technology transfer leaders, licensing professionals, attorneys
at law firms, and in-house counsel involved with emerging informational
technologies) in AI-dominant industries. Notably, such future research
can provide a more thorough account of the debate among theorists and
conflicting results in a few empirical studies as to whether patents and
trade secrets act as economic substitutes or complements, specifically for
AI technologies.
By understanding what aspects of AI technologies inventors
consider unavailable for patent protection (aspects such as being too
abstract or obvious, having a perceived lack of patentability, or being too
weak or difficult to enforce), the USPTO, courts, scholars, and society
346. See supra Part I.
347. See supra Section II.C.
348. See supra Section III.B.
349. See supra Section III.A.2.
350. See W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1769,
1771, 1777– 79 (2016); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2007).
351. See David S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets?,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751, 754–55 (2018) (explaining that much of the data and
questions concerning trade secrets has been underexplored, including “the economic
relationship between patents and trade secrets, the role of trade secrets in promoting firstmover advantage, and the use of trade secrets as strategic intellectual property (IP)
assets,” so much so, that a leading trade secrets researcher has called for scholars to
pursue a new research agenda concerning empirical studies of trade secrets law).
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can have a barometer of how well the patent system is functioning, and
firms can better understand the level of necessary collaboration in AIdominant industries. Such a future empirical project could explore
narratives drawn from interviews conducted with AI inventors to
conclude consistencies and inconsistencies with theoretical
understandings of the patent-versus-trade-secret decision, in relation to
firm-level strategy about controlling information leakage, engaging in
research and development, and promoting alliances.352 By identifying the
perspective of AI inventors, the focused and qualitative interviews would
uncover rich, descriptive views to provide broader insights into patent
policy, firm-level views of trade secrets in relation to the boundaries of
the firm, and the economic relationship between patent and trade secrets
for AI technologies. While it is important to understand the complex
ways in which patents and trade secrets impact business, it is also
important to contextualize these effects within the broader ways that the
USPTO and society can shape AI innovation.353
CONCLUSION
This Article has shed new light on the longstanding debate on the
effects of enhanced patent disclosure, specific to AI inventions. A
skeptical viewpoint toward disclosure considers patent disclosure as not
disclosing useful information, as being inconsistent with the patent
system’s normative goals, and as being distinct from the underlying
technology. Conversely, an influential body of scholars has advocated
for the positive benefits of patent disclosure, including technical
352. See Jonathan Barnett & Ted M. Sichelman, The Case for Noncompetes, 87 U.
CHI. L. REV. 953, 986–87 (2020) (noting that “patents . . . protect against knowledge
leakage resulting from employee movement . . . [and] after consummation of [an]
acquisition”); Orly Lobel, Non-Competes, Human Capital Policy & Regional
Competition, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming), https://bit.ly/2ZW2Afw (arguing that a policy
that protects the ability of employees to move freely between competitors supports the
goals of economic development, and in so doing, noting patenting rates in relation to
high-mobility regions and correlations with innovation).
353. See Remarks by Director Iancu at the AI Event, supra note 3. The USPTO
Director stated:
America’s national security and economic prosperity depend on the United
States’ ability to maintain a leadership role in AI and other emerging
technologies. Additionally, the National Security Strategy calls for the U.S. to
prioritize critical emerging technologies and particularly emphasizes AI as a
field that is advancing rapidly. On a global stage, the U.S. is working with the
other G5 members to “advance a shared understanding of how to best seize the
opportunities presented by AI.” From countries as small as Singapore to ones
as large as China, nations around the world have become extremely competitive
in the innovation ecosphere and especially assertive in emerging technologies
like AI. Only by innovating faster and in key areas will the U.S. be able to
remain competitive.
Id.
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information and knowledge spillovers, demarcation of rights and
prevention of overclaiming, and strategic business benefits. This Article
provided a taxonomy of AI and presented challenges with explainability
and inscrutability to argue that the proponents of enhanced AI patent
disclosure are correct. It reasons that the application of AI-based tools
produces AI-generated output in the form of unidentified inventions.
Indeed, it observed that because AI-generated output may be examined
to meet patentability by the USPTO, expectations that AI-generated
output is worthy of patent protection are entirely foreseeable. This
finding provides law and policymakers with a more robust understanding
of the nuanced ways that AI strains conceptual foundations and gaps and
the unnecessary overlap between patent and trade secret protection.
While it is important to recognize the ex ante costs and efforts of
enhanced AI patent disclosure, the increasing blurring of artificial and
real inventions suggests that disclosure incentives for the inventor and
patent protection from data deposits for AI will provide positive welfare
gains for society.

